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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2000, fighting in south Lebanon between the IDF and the
Shiite militia Hesbollah briefly escalated. When Hesbollah attacks killed
seven Israeli soldiers in two weeks, the Israeli Air Force responded by striking
at civil infrastructure targets in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Israeli air
strikes, an angry Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss convened a press
conference. He declared, "Israel does not have the right to unilaterally
withdraw from the Grapes of Wrath understandings."' Israeli officials
immediately reacted by justifying the raids as a response to Hesbollah
operations launched from civilian areas in violation of the very understandings
Prime Minister al-Hoss had just invoked. For several days, political and
military leaders of the two countries traded accusations, each charging that the
other was violating the Grapes of Wrath Agreement and unilaterally
attempting to change its meaning.
Western observers unfamiliar with the intricacies of the conflict in south
Lebanon were baffled by these repeated references to the "Grapes of Wrath
Understandings," also known as the "April Agreement." Indeed, the April
Agreement between the governments of Israel and Lebanon is a unique
international instrument with no obvious parallels in modem history. The
Agreement is a written document allowing the fighting in south Lebanon to
take place under limited conditions meant to protect noncombatants. While
states have often reached tacit understandings limiting the scope of their
warfare (for example, the agreement not to use chemical weapons in World
War 112), and explicit agreements on absolute ceasefires (for example, the
1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon3), an explicit
convention allowing conflict to continue, albeit under limited conditions, is a
true novelty.
If the concept of an explicit agreement setting out rules for the conduct
of a hot war is bizarre, then so too is the equally unique mechanism that was
established to monitor the implementation of the Agreement-the Israel-
Lebanon Monitoring Group. Consider the following scene. On August 23,
1997, in the southern Lebanese town of Naqura, representatives of the
governments of the United States, France, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon
convened a meeting of the Monitoring Group for the fourth straight day. The
group was meeting in order to discuss complaints issued by Israel and
Lebanon, who accused each other of breaching the Agreement. Just outside
the United Nations compound where the representatives were meeting, Israeli
soldiers and Hesbollah forces engaged in an intense exchange of fire. Both
forces shot mortars as well as small-scale weapons, and the Israeli Air Force
fired at least six air-to-surface missiles in sorties over the area. How is it that
parties to a hot international conflict inflicting near daily casualties could meet
1. Daniel Sobelman, Lebanon Says Israel Violated Agreements, HA'ARETZ (English
Edition), Feb. 9, 2000, available at http://www.haaretzdaily.com.
2. See generally RiCHARD M. PRICE, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOo (1997).
3. Israel and Lebanon, Armistice Agreement, March 23, 1949, Isr.-Leb., 42 U.N.T.S. 287-
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to discuss, not the resolution of the conflict, but rather the continuation of it
under jointly-accepted rules of conduct?
Not only is the scenario difficult for the layman to understand, but
international legal scholars also have not deciphered the meaning of the April
Agreement and its monitoring mechanism. However, as this paper will argue,
the Agreement and its accompanying Monitoring Group are, in fact, best
understood from the vantage point of the international jurist. With an analysis
grounded in international law, what might otherwise appear as an inexplicable
and bizarre institution can come to be seen as a legal instrument crafted by
rational state leaders to promote public order and the well-being of their
constituents. Moreover, under this lens, the Monitoring Group is transformed
into a quintessential dispute resolution mechanism that, in addition to
allowing the parties to air their grievances by nonviolent means, also offers a
much-needed channel for communication between combatants.
A word is in order regarding the approach taken in this study. The
analysis of the April Agreement and the ILMG presented here results from an
investigative methodology that has come to be known as the New Haven
School of jurisprudence. While the understanding of international law and the
methods of study adopted by the New Haven School will be displayed more
fully in the course of this analysis,4 it may be helpful at the outset to describe
the basic outlines of this approach. For the scholar of the New Haven School,
the relevant starting point for an investigation of the April Agreement is an
examination of whether the Agreement was in fact law. For scholars outside
of the New Haven tradition, the logical point of departure would likely be to
ask whether the Agreement was legal. In other words, these scholars would
question the extent to which the Agreement comports with principles of
international and military law and consider whether the document that was
announced to the world on April 26, 1996, should be considered legally valid.
They might go on to ask whether the Agreement was legally binding and
enforceable through legal action in the event of breach. For the New Haven
scholar, by contrast, the important question is not whether the Agreement is
legal, but whether it did, in fact, inform the expectations and shape the
behavior of the parties to the Agreement. If the parties to the Agreement did
treat it as law, then the scholar seeking to understand the nature of the
Agreement also must treat it as such. If the scholar is able to certify that the
principles ensconced in the communication did serve as de facto norms of
law, then she or he must continue the investigation and examine further,
among other issues, the exact content of the law, why it was instituted, how it
operated, and whether its operation proved valuable on the whole.
In considering whether the April Agreement served as law, one must go
beyond the mere recognition that it was formulated as a legal document. As
others have noted, just because a communication purports to be law does not
4. For a more complete explanation of the New Haven School, see W. Michael Reisman,
The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 118 (1992)
and W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 PRoc. AM.
SOC'YOFINT'LL. 101-13 (1981).
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mean that this is necessarily the case.5 Sometimes communications that are
presented as law are more properly treated as lex simulata or lex imperfecta-
messages which, for one reason or another, the communicating party deems
beneficial to issue in the form of law but which do not carry the necessary
"authority signal" or "control intentions' 6 to make them effective statements
of law. As the reader will see, there is, in fact, some sense in which the
Agreement served as legal pageantry. The parties to the conflict knew that a
certain level of civilian casualties would continue, and they used the legal
document and the associated arbitral institution to satisfy their constituents
that they would do their utmost to represent both their interests as partisans of
the state (to protect their interests in Lebanon) and their interests as civilians
(to protect noncombatants). The Agreement also was soft law in the sense that
the parties knew not only that it would be breached, but also that it was not
enforceable in a court of law.
But for all the Agreement's symbolic function and its softness, it was
effective. While civilian casualties continued in the wake of the April
Agreement, the parameters of the conflict in southern Lebanon did change
under its operation. The parties to the Agreement understood that firing at
civilians or firing from civilian areas was now outside the code of accepted
behavior and that there would be repercussions from such actions, including
sanction by the ILMG and reprisal by the opposing military force. Skeptics
might argue that the fact that both sides violated the April Agreement
throughout its nearly four years of duration implies that the Agreement did not
operate as a norm of behavior. However, the careful observer will note that
such violations tested the bounds of the Agreement, establishing it as law.
Thus, the policy content of the Agreement continued to exhibit what has been
called an "authority signal" and a "control intention."7 Indeed, as this study
will demonstrate, the April Agreement did communicate a meaningful
prescription to all the parties to the conflict in southern Lebanon, powerfully
shaping their expectations regarding the accepted norms of behavior and the
implications of deviating from such norms.
Using this legally-oriented analysis, one can begin to make sense of the
April Agreement and to understand why the system lasted as long as it did-
roughly four years. In a fragile region, with systemic forces driving them
towards what would be extremely costly violence, both Israel and Syria were
forced to search for a means to keep their conflict under control. The April
Agreement between Israel and Lebanon served just this purpose; as the
analysis below will demonstrate, it allowed Israel and Syria to continue to
joust in the Lebanese arena, but to do so in a controlled manner that would not
spiral into all-out war. The prohibition on targeting civilians constrained the
respective military forces enough to keep the level of violence within
acceptable limits. Furthermore, by reducing civilian suffering, the parties were
able to avoid the kind of domestic political pressures that could lead to an
Israeli-Syrian war. Facing an intractable and extremely dangerous conflict, the
5. Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, supra note 4.
6. See id. at 113.
7. See id.
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parties to the war in Lebanon turned to the tools of the lawyer, legislating for
themselves an innovative and effective instrument. The fact that the
Agreement was enshrined in a written and highly-publicized document added
to its strength and durability, allowing it to survive the rigorous test it was
destined to face in the brutal conflict in southern Lebanon.
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this legal system lies in the
monitoring mechanism that the parties established to govern its
implementation, the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group. An analysis informed
by the New Haven School explains how this arbitral institution helped
enhance adherence to the Agreement. Well aware that breaches of the April
Agreement would lead to public sanctioning by the ILMG, the parties had
strong incentives to uphold its strictures. Moreover, the monitoring
mechanism provided the parties with a micro-arena in which they could take
action to satisfy their constituents that they were pursuing their interests,
without actually ratcheting up the level of violence in south Lebanon. In this
regard, the approach chosen here-that of the New Haven School-proves
informative in yet another way. The New Haven scholar recognizes that while
the debate in the forum of the ILMG was conducted in terms more familiar to
the soldier than to the lawyer, the content of the debate carried legal meaning.
While the representatives to the Monitoring Group framed their discussion in
terms of the April Agreement and the day-in, day-out events in southern
Lebanon rather than principles of international law theoretically codified in
legal textbooks, their give-and-take in the specialized forum of the ILMG
served to establish the true code of conduct that governed the conflict in
southern Lebanon. Most interestingly, this forum for non-violent venting also
provided the parties with a channel for direct and confidential
communications in which they could keep specific episodes of escalation
under control and issue more general signals regarding their shifting and
potentially explosive relationship.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Israel first began to intervene militarily in Lebanon in the 1960s in
response to ongoing guerrilla attacks on the residents of northern Israel.
Palestinian guerrilla groups, nominally under the control of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), increased their activity in southern Lebanon
following their expulsion from Jordan during the 1971 Black September
campaign. Israel responded to cross-border attacks with strikes by the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) against guerrilla groups in southern Lebanon.
The first large-scale Israeli operation in Lebanon came in 1978, in the
aftermath of a bus hijacking by Fatah terrorists that resulted in the death of
thirty-seven Israeli civilians. The IDF launched Operation Litani, a sweeping
ground incursion up to the Litani River, a major east-west demarcation line in
southern Lebanon, in an attempt to clear guerrilla groups out of the area. 8 in
8. In response to the Israeli incursion, the United Nations Security Council passed two
resolutions which to this day remain fundamental points of reference for all parties involved in Lebanon.
Resolution 425 called for Israel "immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial
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the aftermath of Operation Litani, Israel withdrew its forces from southern
Lebanon, and began to give increasing support to an allied Christian militia,
the South Lebanon Army (SLA), in the hope that it would be able to control
the region as a proxy force. This aid program proved to be the origin of a
wider Israeli foreign policy aimed at controlling a strip of land abutting the
Israeli border as a "security zone" in order to provide a buffer between Israel's
northern residents and armed Lebanese groups.9
Sporadic violence continued until 1982, when, in response to escalating
attacks, the Israeli government decided to launch a major military offensive to
wipe out the Palestinian guerrilla forces in southern Lebanon. The IDF
launched Operation Peace for the Galillee and drove all the way to Beirut,
successfully forcing the PLO to leave southern Lebanon. In 1985, the Israeli
government decided to pull the IDF back, but Israeli soldiers remained in the
strip of territory contiguous to the northern border of Israel so as to safeguard
Israeli control over this security zone. From 1985 to May 2000, the IDF,
together with the SLA, controlled the security zone in an attempt to keep
guerrilla forces from threatening civilians in northern Israel.
The period from 1985 until Israel's complete withdrawal from Lebanon
in the spring of 2000 was characterized by a constant background level of
violence, including both large- and small-arms fire between the IDF and the
SLA on one side and Hesbollah on the other. Israeli infantry troops and
armored units played a kind of cat-and-mouse game with Hesbollah forces,
each laying ambushes for the other and hoping they would be the first to open
fire on surprised enemy forces. Meanwhile, Hesbollah artillery units fired on
fortified Israeli positions in south Lebanon and were in turn answered by
Israeli artillery positions along the Israeli border.
While Hesbollah is the party that actually plays out the conflict with the
IDF and the SLA in southern Lebanon, Syria is the real power with whom
Israel contends in that arena. The Syrian and Israeli governments, locked in
their own state of war and their own territorial dispute, have been acting out
their conflict through proxy in south Lebanon for the past thirty years. 10 Syria
claims important military and economic interests in Lebanon and has tried to
use the violence in southern Lebanon as a lever by which to push Israel to
bargain on a withdrawal from the Golan Heights." While Hesbollah receives
integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory." S.C. Res. 33/425, U.N. SCOR,
33d Sess., 2074th mtg., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978). Resolution 426 established the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), an international military force with a mandate to "confirm
... the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore... international peace and security and assist... the
Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." S.C. Res. 33/425,
U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., 2074th mtg., parm. 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978). For a useful collection of legal
documents on Lebanon and the Middle East, see THE ARAB-ISRAEL COLLECrION: ANNUAL REPORTS
(Yonah Libermann & Willem-Jan van der Wolf, eds. 1995).
9. For an account of how Israel's support of sympathetic forces in southern Lebanon led to
the emergence of the security zone, see BEATE HAMZRACHI, THE EMERGENCE OF THE SouTH LEBANON
SEcurry BELT (1988).
10. For an analysis of how Israel and Syria have vented their rivalry through Lebanon, see
YAIR EVRON, WAR AND INTERVENTION IN LEBANON: THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DETERRENCE DIALOGUE
(1987) and MOSHEMA'Oz, SYRIA AND ISRAEL: FROM WAR TO PEACEMAKING? (1995).
11. For an analysis of Syrian interests in Lebanon, see NEIL QuILLIAM, SYRIA AND THE NEW
WORLD ORDER (1999).
[Vol. 27: 249
Clashing Behavior, Converging Interests
much of its funding and training from Iran, Syria wields significant control
over the organization and has shown an ability to ratchet its level of violence
up or down according to its perceived interests. 12 Syria dominates Lebanon
politically and has an estimated 40,000 troops stationed in the country to
ensure ongoing control.
13
In the late 1990s a growing death toll of Israeli soldiers serving in
Lebanon exerted domestic political pressure on the Israeli government to
completely withdraw Israeli troops from that country. Ehud Barak was elected
Israeli Prime Minister in May of 1999, after running on a platform committed
to withdrawal from Lebanon within one year of assuming office. Barak
fulfilled his campaign promise in May of 2000, when Israeli troops completed
a swift move back across the Israeli border.
I. PRELUDE TO THE APRIL AGREEMENT
The Agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon in April of 1996
was not the first attempt by the two sides to keep the conflict in south
Lebanon under control by means of a legal convention. Indeed, in order to
fully appreciate the April Agreement and its relative success, one must
consider it in light of previous attempts at controlling the conflict in south
Lebanon through understandings among the various parties.
Israel and armed Palestinian groups in Lebanon sought to control their
conflict through cease-fire arrangements as early as 1981. In July of that year,
the cycle of violence between the PLO and the IDF escalated into the "War of
the Katyushas, ' 14 an exchange of military attacks which was halted by an
Israeli-PLO cease-fire agreement brokered by U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Philip Habib.15 This ceasefire was broken by Operation Peace for the
12. For an analysis of Syrian-Iranian interactions in the Lebanese arena, see HUSSEIN J.
AGHA & AHMAD S. KHALIDI, SYRIA AND IRAN: RIVALRY AND COOPERATION (1995); and
ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAM1 & RAYMOND A. HNNEBUSCH, SYRIA AND IRAN: MIDDLE POWERS IN A
PENETRATED REGIONAL SYSTEM (1997). Ma'oz also provides an analysis of Syria and Iran's relative
influence over Hesbollah. MA'OZ, supra note 10, at 187-88, 230.
13. This domination, first sanctioned by the Taif Accords of 1989, is now supposedly legally
supported by the Lebanon-Syria Treaty of Co-operation, signed on May 20, 1991. Article 1 of the Treaty
reads:
The two states will work to achieve the highest level of co-operation and co-
ordination in all political, economic, security, cultural, scientific, and other fields in a
manner that will realize the interests of the two fraternal countries within the
framework of respect for their individual sovereignty and independence and will
enable the two countries to use their political, economic, and security resources to
provide prosperity and stability, ensure their pan-Arab and national security, and
expand and strengthen their common interests, as an aflirmation of the brotherly
relations and guarantee of their common destiny.
Lebanon-Syria Treaty of Co-operation, May 20, 1991, Syr.-Leb., art. 1, reprinted in 1 THE ARAB-IsRAEL
COLLECTION: ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 8, at 348 (Yonah Libermann & Willem-Jan van der Wolf
eds., 1995). See also TaifAccords, Oct. 22, 1989, Syr.-Leb., reprinted in id. at 340-41.
14. The Katyusha is a Russian-made World War II rocket with a low level of accuracy. It has
been a weapon of choice for Hesbollah, used to inflict damage on metropolitan targets in northern Israel.
W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALEJ. INT'L L. 381, 384 n.13 (1997).
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN PAWNS: LAWS OF WAR VIOLATIONS AND THE USE OF
WEAPONS ON THE IsRAEL-LEBANON BORDER, 31-32 n.78 (1996).
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Galillee and the Israel-Lebanon War of 1982-85, which also involved several
failed cease-fire agreements between Israel and armed forces in Lebanon. 16
While this dynamic of repeated, failed Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire
arrangements is of interest for the present purposes, even more important is
the over-arching dynamic of the Israeli-Syrian dialogue in Lebanon from the
1960s onward. In the spring of 1976, during a particularly sensitive period of
posturing between Israel and Syria, the two states recognized that they could
mutually benefit from reaching an understanding concerning accepted
behavior in Lebanon in order to avoid all-out war. Signaling to one another
through public statements to the media, military maneuvers in the field, and
explicit messages sent through Washington, Israel and Syria established a
system of "red-lines" under which behavior within the specified limits would
not be taken as cause for war. The redlines limited the size of forces either
side could deploy in Lebanon, stipulated the type of weapons they could use
in the arena, and circumscribed geographic boundaries beyond which the
forces were not to move. Although it did undergo several periods of
significant stress and did evolve over time, the red-lines system survived and
preserved a relative level of tranquility in Israeli-Syrian relations until the
outbreak of the Israel-Lebanon War in 1982."7
After the war, once again needing to avoid a costly military
confrontation, Israel and Syria rebuilt the red-lines system.18 As was the case
with the pre-war red-lines system, the postwar red-lines system has not proven
entirely stable, and Israel and Syria have had to tacitly or explicitly bargain on
new understandings at several critical junctures. Because Syria has often
employed Lebanese armed elements as a proxy for its own military forces in
its struggle against Israel in Lebanon, these codes of behavior have often
regulated the actions of these other groups, rather than those of Syria and
Israel alone.
The most relevant understanding for the purposes of this Article was the
one reached between Israel and Hesbollah in July 1993. That code of behavior
governed Israeli-Hesbollah interactions in the period leading up to the 1996
Agreement. In July 1993, in response to an escalating spiral of violence in
south Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin authorized an offensive
by the IDF in an attempt to weaken Hesbollah's military capabilities and its
standing among the civilian population of the area. As has often been the case,
the deterioration in the Lebanese arena was tied to developments in Israeli-
Syrian relations.19
16. See, e.g., EVRON, supra note 10, at 145-46.
17. See id., passim.
18. Id. at 170-74.
19. Itamar Rabinovich, the Israeli Ambassador to Washington and the official who led the
Israeli delegation to Israeli-Syrian peace talks at the time, has pointed out the ever-present connection
between the Israeli operation and Israeli-Syrian relations. He writes:
In considering the pros and cons of such an operation, Israel was not held back by the
prospect of an adverse effect on the negotiations with Syria. If Syria believed that by
offering passive or indirect support to [Hesbollah] it was acquiring greater leverage
over Israel, let it be reminded of the facts of the underlying military balance and of
the risks inherent in Syria's Lebanese policy. The feeling in Israel that Syria was
stoking the fire in south Lebanon was reinforced by the fact that Abmad Jibril and his
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Operation Accountability, seven days of coordinated air, naval and
artillery strikes, resulted in widespread damage and sent residents of south
Lebanon fleeing northward.20 The offensive abated when Secretary of State
Warren Christopher was able to broker a ceasefire between Israel and
Hesbollah, apparently through understandings with Syria and Lebanon.
It remains unclear which states or groups were party to the unwritten
understanding and exactly what it stipulated, though all parties made clear that
it was aimed at protecting civilians from military fire. Israel's then Deputy
Chief of Staff, Amnon Lipkin Shahak, has since reportedly told the Knesset
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the understandings "were
reached with the United States, which talked with Syria, which talked with
Hesbollah, which again talked with the Syrians, who again talked with the
Americans, who reported back to us. '21 In addition to the agreement to spare
civilians, the understanding seems to have contained a geographic element
whereby Israel promised not to make pre-emptive strikes north of the security
zone. An Israeli Knesset member who was among those briefed by Prime
Minister Rabin was quoted by the Israeli press as saying:
The Prime Minister made it clear Israel can only attack north of the security zone under
two conditions. First, ifHesbollah violates the accord by firing Katyushas at the Galilee.
In this case, Israel is not bound by any restrictions. Second, Israel can only strike north of
the security zone... if hit 
first .... 2r
organization (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command),
Syria's distinct prot6gds, had joined the fray.
ITAMARRABiNOVICH, THE BRnK OF PEACE 102 (1998).
20. Reports varied, but most international sources placed the number of Lebanese killed
between 110 and 130 with an estimated 450 wounded. Agence France-Presse reported 127 Lebanese
killed. Ceasefire is Basis for Talks with Beirut, Damascus, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 2, 1993,
LEXIS, News Group File. The Jerusalem Post placed the figure at 114. The Israeli government claimed
that the death figures included fifty to eighty Hesbollah fighters. Two Israeli civilians and one IDF
soldier were killed by Hesbollah fire. David Makovsky, Dispute on Whether Cease-Fire Limits IDF,
JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 2, 1993, at 1.
21. Qol Yisra'el (Israel), Chief of Staff Discusses Lebanon, Hamas Attacks, Closure, Apr. 3,
1996, FBIS-NES-96-065, available at http://wnc.fedworld.gov. Itamar Rabinovich recalls the events in
the following way:
At the week's end Secretary Christopher increased his efforts at obtaining a cease-
fire, and at the end of a long night during which he communicated on the telephone
with Rabin (through Dennis Ross and myself) and with Asad (through Foreign
Minister Shara), an end to the fighting and a new set of rules were agreed upon.
RAnINOVICH, supra note 19, at 103. According to a Washington Post article, Iran was also indirectly
involved in the negotiations. Its correspondent reported, "The cease-fire was brokered by Secretary of
State Warren Christopher in phone calls to the leaders of Israel, Syria and Lebanon and through indirect
contacts with Iran, Hesbollah's chief sponsor." David Hoffman, Israel Halts Bombardment of Lebanon,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at A22. The late Syrian President Hafez al-Asad publicly denied that Syria
was party to the agreement, stating at a press conference, "We know that an understanding was reached
between the two sides in 1993, and Syria was not a party to it. The said understanding provides that the
resistance in [s]outh Lebanon would not rocket northern Israel while Israel would not bombard civilians
or civilian targets." MImEASTMmRO, Apr. 3, 1996, on file with author. But Rabinovich maintains,
"The Hariri [Lebanese] government was a party to the oral agreement, but the real guarantor of
Hesbollah's good behavior was Syria." RABINovICH, supra note 19, at 103.
22. Makovsky, supra note 20, at 1. The same report explained the understanding as
stipulating that if Israel does retaliate north of the security zone, its fire must be directed only at the
source of the instigating attack.
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These descriptions of the understanding may very well be accurate but
they have been disputed by high-ranking Israeli officials. Furthermore, then
Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin told reporters that the understanding
was a verbal arrangement "without articles and without details."
24
For the three years following the July 1993 understanding, Israel and
Hesbollah continued to fight daily with the expectation on both sides that each
was to avoid firing upon civilians. Nonetheless, civilians were frequently
harmed by the fighting in the region, as they were either inadvertently hit by
projectiles aimed at military forces or purposely targeted . Modem military
weapons are so powerful in their infliction of damage that civilians several
hundred meters from an intended target can be maimed or killed inadvertently.
The problem was especially acute in south Lebanon where Israeli forces
operating weapons with mass fire-power often came under attack from
irregular forces in or near populated areas. While one might distinguish
between purposefully firing at entirely civilian targets and deliberately
returning fire to the source of an attack from inside a populated area, both
forces responded to violations of the understanding by firing on civilian areas
of the other country. Despite, or perhaps because of, these forceful responses
to perceived breaches, the understanding held in place as a set of rules of
engagement until April 1996.
The July 1993 understanding dissolved when the violence in south
Lebanon spiraled into a major Israeli military offensive in April 1996.
Between March 4 and April 10, an increased level of operations on both sides
resulted in the deaths of seven Israeli soldiers, three Lebanese civilians and at
least one Hesbollah fighter, and the injury of sixteen Israeli soldiers, seven
26Lebanese civilians and six Israeli civilians. While Hesbollah attacks on
Israeli soldiers stationed within Lebanon fell within the rules established in
July 1993, they placed substantial domestic political pressure on the
government of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Peres was facing what he knew
23. Makovsky's report pointed out that these interpretations of the understanding were at
variance with then Chief of Staff Ehud Barak's public insistence that the understanding did not restrict
the Israeli military's freedom of action north of the security zone. See id. Likewise, Ma'oz describes the
regime as an understanding between Israel, Syria and Lebanon "whereby Damascus and Beirut
undertook to prevent the launching of Katyusha rockets from Lebanon into Israel (although not against
the Israeli-held security zone in southern Lebanon). Israel undertook not to attack Lebanese civilians in
the course of its military actions against Hesbollah targets." MA'oz, supra note 10, at 235. Interestingly,
Rabinovich's account does include a geographical provision: "At the core of the understanding were an
undertaking by Hesbollah not to launch rockets against Israel and a matching commitment by Israel not
to fire into villages north of the security zone unless fired upon from within a village. There was no
undertaking to spare the security zone, and increased pressure on it could be expected." RABiNovicH,
supra note 19, at 103.
24. Ceasefire is Basis for Talks with Beirut, Damasus, supra note 20.
25. For reports on the violence between 1993 and 1996, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 15; and Amnesty International Report, July 1996, AI Index MDE 15/42/96, Unlawful Killing
During Operation "Grapes of Wrath," available at http://web.amnesty.org. The author of a book on
Hesbollah relates the following figures for the fighting between the July 1993 understanding and its
breakdown in April of 1996: "Hesbollah claimed that Israel breached the truce and attacked civilian
targets 231 times between 1993 and 1996. In return, the Party of God says it retaliated with Katyshas
against settlements in northern Israel on thirteen occasions." HALA JABER, HEZmOLLAH: BORN wITH A
VENGEANCE 173 (1997). Jaber maintains that these numbers are supported by United Nations and
Western diplomatic sources. See id.
26. HUMAN RGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 15.
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would be an arduous election battle against the Likud Party's Benyamin
Netanyahu on May 29. Peres had assumed office upon Yitzchak Rabin's
assassination in November 1995. Lacking both an electoral mandate and the
proud military record that many Israeli political leaders have stood upon,
Peres knew that Netanyahu, a former member of one of the IDF's most elite
units and brother of a military hero, would make national security a major
issue in the upcoming campaign. A series of suicide bombings by the militant
Palestinian faction Hamas exacerbated the Israeli political situation and added
pressure for Peres to take a strong military stand. When Hesbollah increased
its cross-border Katyusha rocket attacks, Peres reacted with a powerful Israeli
offensive.
By unleashing Israel's naval, air and artillery power across southern
Lebanon, Peres hoped that the operation code-named Grapes of Wrath would
achieve what Operation Accountability had attempted to accomplish three
years earlier. Once again, Damascus was in many ways the real intended
audience of the signals being sent by Israel-the operation was aimed at
coercing Syria into clamping down on Hesbollah activity in southern
Lebanon.
27
From the start of the operation, Peres sought to craft a new set of
understandings more favorable to Israel. Reports have since indicated that his
original hope was to achieve a full ceasefire, including a prohibition on
attacks on Israeli soldiers in Lebanon. Peres was ready to pledge that if the
ceasefire held for nine months, Israel would begin negotiations for a complete
withdrawal from Lebanon.28
Peres's negotiating stance and the entire situation in south Lebanon
changed dramatically with the events of April 18, 1996. Responding to
Hesbollah mortar fire on Israeli ground troops, Israeli artillery fired on the
vicinity of a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) compound in
the village of Qana. More than 100 Lebanese civilians who had sought refuge
in the compound were killed and many were wounded in the attack.29 Israel
immediately came under severe international criticism and Peres was forced to
find a way to extricate himself from the quagmire of the operation only six
weeks before the election.
On April 20, two days after the Qana incident, Secretary of State
Christopher flew to Damascus to begin a week-long session of shuttle
diplomacy to bring the escalation to an end. Christopher was not alone in his
27. Israeli Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich points out the connection between the Syrian-
Israeli relationship and these developments in Lebanon. He writes:
At the core of the operation lay the notion that Israel could achieve at least some of its
goals by exerting pressure on the government of Rafiq Hariri [of Lebanon] through
destroying some economic targets and through causing the population in the south to
flee to Beirut. Hariri would then be expected to use his influence with Damascus to
change its own conduct.
RABINOVICH, supra note 19, at 231.
28. See Zvi Bar'el, Katyushas Have a Course of Their Own, HA'AREIZ (English Edition),
Feb. 16, 2000, available at http://www.haaretzdaily.com.
29. For an in-depth legal analysis of the incident, see Reisman, supra note 14. See also Louis
Rene Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 141 (1997).
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diplomatic efforts. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Italian
Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos
Westendorp, Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring and French Foreign Minister
Herve de Charette also flew to the region to consult with state leaders. 30 The
United States and France apparently each offered their own proposals to end
the fighting.3' It remains unclear which countries and groups took part in the
negotiations. Christopher appears to have done most of his mediating with
Asad and Peres, only traveling to Lebanon to meet with Prime Minister Hariri
once a deal was basically made.32 On April 26, 1996, after a full week of
shuttle diplomacy, Secretary of State Christopher announced the achievement
of a new written agreement between the governments of Israel and Lebanon.
IV. THE APRIL AGREEMENT
On April 26, 1996, Secretary of State Christopher, standing alongside
Prime Minister Peres in Jerusalem, announced the achievement of the written
30. Though not within the scope of this Article, one should note the fascinating intricacies of
the intense diplomacy that took place over the course of this week. For Secretary of State Christopher's
perspective on the diplomatic process, see U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, Interview
of the Secretary of State Warren Christopher on The Newshour with Jim Lehrer (PBS Television
broadcast, Apr. 30, 1996), available at http://www.state.gov.
31. In a radio interview on April 23, State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns explained
the American proposal as an attempt to "strengthen [the 1993 understanding] by putting it into writing,
by clearing away some of the ambiguities that did exist in that 1993 Agreement." Interview with
Nicholas Burns, Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 23, 1996), available at 1996
WL 2814555. In this regard, an Israeli lawyer involved in the drafting process has reported that "each of
the sides remembered different things as to what had been understood in 1993." Interview with
anonymous Israeli government lawyer (Dec. 14, 2000). Some reports have speculated that the American
proposal included a provision for a full cease-fire leading to an Israeli withdrawal. See, e.g., JABER,
supra note 25, at 195. The French proposal was reportedly based on U.N. Resolution 425, supra note 8,
and called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. In the kind of power politics one can expect
from the United States and France, diplomats from the two countries competed to some extent in vying
for the right to claim any successful cease-fire as their own achievement. One can hear some of this
rivalry reflected in the statements of State Department spokesman Nicholas Bums over the course of the
diplomatic efforts. On April 18, he noted, "There are others who are acting along these lines, most
notably the French government. And we are working with the French, we congratulate the French in
their effort. I can't say that their proposals are exactly consistent in all respects with ours, but I think the
spirit of those proposals is exactly consistent .... Transcript- U.S. Department of State Press Briefing
with Nick Burns, U.S. NEwSwiRE, Apr. 18, 1996, available at 1996 WL 5620792. On April 23, Bums
more boldly announced, "I think that the United States has now made itself the sole negotiating channel
among Syria, Lebanon and Israel. France is present in the region in the form of its foreign minister. It's
largely been supportive of the United States. I don't believe that France will, in the end, be the country
that negotiates this. I think that will remain with the United States." Interview with Nicholas Bums,
supra. Once a cease-fire was achieved, de Charette conceded in a television interview that his efforts
had "provoked a certain irritation, notably for the Americans." Remarks, MIDDLE EAST REP., Apr. 27,
1996, [hereinafter Remarks] at 4.
32. One should note that Christopher did include a wider array of Arab leaders in early stages
of the diplomacy efforts, consulting with Egyptian and Saudi Arabian leaders. Christopher Widens
Consultations over Israel-Lebanon Crisis, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 17, 1996, available at 1996
WL 3839832. Hesbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah met with Syrian officials and announced a set
of pre-conditions for a cease-fire on which his group insisted. However, Middle East analysts have
speculated that Lebanon and Syria would not permit Hesbollah to participate in the negotiations for their
own self-interested motivations. The Lebanese government may have wanted to retain more control over
the outcome than Hesbollah, and Syria may have been trying to keep Iranian influence over the situation
to a minimum. See Joseph Matar, Out of Favor, JERUSALEM REP., Sept. 19, 1996, at 30; Remarks, supra
note 31, at 9.
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but unsigned Agreement. Prime Minister Hariri stood with Foreign Minister
de Charrette as he simultaneously made the same announcement in Beirut:
The United States understands that after discussions with the Governments of Israel and
Lebanon, and in consultation with Syria, Lebanon and Israel will insure the following:
1) Armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by Katyusha rockets or by any
kind of weapon into Israel.
2) Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or
civilian targets in Lebanon.
3) Beyond this, the two parties commit to insuring that under no circumstances will
civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and
electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.
4) Without violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from
exercising the right of self-defense.
A Monitoring Group is established consisting of the United States, France, Syria,
Lebanon and Israel. Its task will be to monitor the application of the understanding stated
above. Complaints will be submitted to the Monitoring Group. In the event of a claimed
violation of the understanding, the party submitting the complaint will do so within 24
hours. Procedures for dealing with the complaints will be set by the Monitoring Group.
The United States will also organize a Consultative Group, to consist of France, the
European Union, Russia and other interested parties, for the purpose of assisting in the
reconstruction needs of Lebanon.
It is recognized that the understanding to bring the current crisis between Lebanon and
Israel to an end cannot substitute for a permanent solution. The United States understands
the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region. Toward this end, the
United States proposes the resumption of negotiations between Syria and Israel and
between Lebanon and Israel at a time to be agreed upon, with the objective of reaching
comprehensive peace. The United States understands that it is desirable that these
negotiations be conducted in a climate of stability and tranquillity.
This understanding will be announced simultaneously at 1800 hours, April 26, 1996, in
all countries concerned. The time set for implementation is 0400 hours, April 27, 1996.
3
The text of the Agreement is rather straightforward in its wording and its
demands from the parties. Nonetheless some nuances do deserve comment,
especially in regard to what distinguishes this agreement from its predecessor.
First, and perhaps most obviously, the Agreement is a written memorandum
that was publicly announced and widely distributed. Not only could there now
be no question among the parties themselves as to the provisions of the
Agreement, but civilians in both Israel and Lebanon as well as interested
parties anywhere in the world would know what the two governments had
pledged.
33. The Agreement was published in various media forums, and its English text has always
appeared in a form substantially identical to the version quoted here, which was taken from the New
York Times. N.Y.TMs, Mideast Accord: Restricting the Violence in Lebanon, Apr. 27, 1996, at AS.
34. In hailing the Agreement, President Clinton made clear the importance he attached to the
fact that this was a written accord. He announced, "Because it is in writing, this Agreement will be less
likely to break down than the informal agreements that had been in place since 1993." Remarks, supra
note 31, at 3. Likewise, the State Department's Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross
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As is the nature with international written agreements, the parties crafted
the text with extreme care and political guile. One should note, for example,
that France, despite active engagement in the diplomatic process, is not
mentioned as a party to the understanding itself, though France is included in
the Monitoring Group that was established to oversee the implementation of
the accord. The memorandum is written as an understanding on the part of the
United States that Lebanon and Israel will undertake to ensure various
conditions. Therefore, unlike the 1993 understanding, under which it was
never entirely clear which parties were bound (Syria? Lebanon? Hesbollah?),
the 1996 accord is an agreement between two specific state entities. Syria's
importance as the controlling force in Lebanon is signaled with the notation
that the understanding is made "in consultation with Syria," but the
Agreement itself, as far as it bound any particular parties, bound only Israel
and Lebanon.
The first two provisions in themselves comprise the basic 1993
convention. Hesbollah will not fire into metropolitan Israel, and Israel and the
SLA will not fire at civilians in Lebanon. As did the earlier oral
understanding, this accord honors international law in its protection of
noncombatants. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention declares,
"Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.
' 35
Article 51(6) of Protocol I declares, "Attacks against the civilian population or
civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.,
36
One should note that while there may or may not have been a geographic
provision in the 1993 understanding, there is no such element in the 1996
Agreement. While attacks by the IDF on Hesbollah targets north of the red-
line may have continued to carry special meaning for all of the parties
involved in the conflict, the formal text does not afford such attacks any
special relevance.
The third provision is a new and important innovation from the 1993
understanding. Now, not only can civilian areas not be targeted, but they also
cannot be used as launching grounds for attacks. This provision honors
international law in its prohibition of using civilians to shield military
objectives,37 and it meets Israel's concern that since 1993 Hesbollah forces
had been exploiting the Israeli commitment not to strike civilian targets by
launching attacks on Israeli troops from civilian areas in Lebanon. Moreover,
maintained:
I think what's most important is that the difference between 1993 and where we are today is
that, first, we have an agreement that we actually negotiated, not only over the phone in an
oral way but we actually produced it in writing. That gives it much more precision, it makes
it much more explicit, and it gives it more weight on the part of all those who helped us
produce it. That's number one.
Interview with Dennis Ross, Morning Edition, (National Public Radio broadcast, May 9, 1996),
available at 1996 WL 2814687.
35. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, art. 48, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter First Additional Protocol].
37. See id. arts. 51(7), 58(b).
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the concern was especially pertinent to the 1996 negotiations in light of the
incident at Qana, which Israel insisted would not have occurred had Hesbollah
forces not fired from the vicinity of the UNIFIL compound.38
The fourth provision, which reserves the right of self-defense of all
parties, is a recognition, and perhaps a sanctioning, of the fact that the fighting
in south Lebanon would go on. For Lebanon and Hesbollah the provision has
meant that they are entitled to continue to try to force Israel to withdraw from
Lebanese territory, while for the IDF and the SLA it has meant that they have
the right to patrol south Lebanon in an attempt to wipe out Hesbollah.
The text also includes provisions for the establishment of two new
bodies: a Consultative Group and a Monitoring Group. The Consultative
Group, whose membership includes the European Union and Russia, two
powers left out of the rest of the Agreement, is intended as an aid organization
to assist in the reconstruction of Lebanon in the wake of the substantial
damage inflicted upon it by the Israeli military forces. The Israel-Lebanon
Monitoring Group (ILMG), which is studied in greater depth in Part V below,
is an innovative dispute resolution mechanism intended to deal with the
difficulties that would arise with respect to the enforcement of the Agreement.
V. THE ISRAEL-LEBANON MONITORING GROUP (THE ILMG)
The April Agreement itself, although sparsely worded in most of its
provisions, contains several stipulations applying to the Israel-Lebanon
Monitoring Group. The Agreement provides that the group will be comprised
of five parties-the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Like the
negotiations on the rest of the Agreement, the negotiations that led to these
provisions were secret, but Itamar Rabinovich, who at the time served as
Israel's Ambassador to Washington and as the head of Israel's delegation in
peace talks with Syria, has written that France was included at Syria's demand
despite Israeli and American reluctance.39 After stating that the task of the
group is to monitor the application of the accord, the Agreement goes on to
specify that complaints will be submitted to the group within twenty-four
hours of an alleged violation of the understanding.4 In addition, because the
Agreement of April 26 was not itself the proper forum to set out more detailed
38. Dennis Ross underlined the importance of this provision in a radio interview when he
mentioned it as the second most important change from the 1993 understanding, after the fact that this
set of rules is written. He insisted, "Number two is that within this we also have gone beyond what we
had before, in the sense that ... very explicitly, civilian targets are not to be -attacked, but they're also
not to be used ... as shields from which to launch attacks." Interview with Dennis Ross, supra note 34.
39. "It was Syrian insistence on a French role as a condition to cease-fire and agreement that
brought France into the monitoring group." RABINOVICH, supra note 19, at 233. Syria's demand for
French participation in the Monitoring Group makes sense given America's support for Israel and
France's historical association with Lebanon and Syria in international politics.
40. This provision seems to serve purposes equivalent to those served by statues of
limitations. By bringing the complaints immediately, the states would ensure that the committee would
have access to more conclusive evidence, especially if it undertook a verification mission, as initially
foreseen by the parties. In addition, because the prompt submission of complaints would allow the
committee to deal with a specific violation as quickly as possible, the military actors might be persuaded
to hold offon reprisals until after the committee had attempted to diffuse any crisis.
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procedural rules for the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, the text provides
that the Monitoring Group will establish working rules for dealing with the
complaints.
Rather than waiting for the first meeting of the Monitoring Group and
allowing the delegates to the group itself to establish a set of procedural rules,
representatives of the group's member states met at the U.S. State Department
to negotiate a set of working rules over the course of May 1996.41 The talks
were near resolution when they were postponed for the Israeli elections on
May 29, and the rules were eventually initialed on July 12, 1996 when the
new Israeli Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, visited Washington. The
exact substance of the protocol was not made public at the time, though the
basic outlines of the working rules were revealed to the press, and in 1998
Israeli Minister of Justice Yossi Beilin published a book on the Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon in which he presented the text of the protocol as an
appendix.
42
While the particular workings of the committee mechanism will be
examined more closely below, several points about the procedural rules
should be noted. The Monitoring Group is expressly presented as a temporary
institution, to exist until "a peaceful solution through negotiations is
reached., 43 The group itself would not participate in peace negotiations. Its
function is limited to "monitoring the application"'44 of the April Agreement
and "deal[ing] with" and "address[ing]"A complaints about violations of the
Agreement. The working rules reiterate the April Agreement's list of member
states, and stipulate that each delegation is to be headed by senior military
personnel. 46 The institution was to be headed by a Chair and a Co-chair, seats
that would alternate every five months between the United States and France,
with the United States appointing the first chair and France appointing the first
co-chair.47
The document on the working rules does not specify a location for the
group's headquarters-each Chair is to determine its address at an appropriate
diplomatic mission48-though in practice both the United States and France
maintained an office for the Chair in Nicosia, Cyprus. The headquarters is to
41. The delegates to the Monitoring Group did, however, continue to expand and shape the
working rules at the group's first meeting and in subsequent meetings thereafter. See infra Parts VII and
VIII.
42. YOSSI BEILIN, HA'MADRICH LE'YETZIAH MI'LEVANON [A GUIDE TO AN ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON] 123-25 (1998). The text was also published with only minor differences
as an appendix to Rotem Giladi's article on the Agreement. See Rotem M. Giladi, The Practice and
Case Law of Israel in Matters Related to International Law, 32 ISR. L. REv. 355, app. II at 387-89
(1998). Giladi has assured the author that the text is authentic, and the author was not made to feel
otherwise when he presented it to Israeli officials who participated in the committee meetings. See
Appendix A for the text of the working rules.
43. ILMG Working Rules, art. L.A. See infra Appendix A.
44. Id. art. 2.A. See infra Appendix A.
45. Id. art. 2.B. See infra Appendix A.
46. Id. art. 3.A. See infra Appendix A. One should note that while the Israeli, Syrian and
Lebanese delegations have, in fact, been led by military officers, the American and French delegations
have been headed by diplomatic officers.
47. Id. art. 1.B. See infra Appendix A.
48. Id. art. 1.D. See infra Appendix A.
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accept complaints from Lebanon and Israel "at any time."49 One should note
that the limitation of the power to submit complaints to just Lebanon and
Israel seems to deviate from the text of the April Agreement, which seems not
to limit this power, but rather states in general terms that "[c]omplaints will be
submitted to the Monitoring Group." When the Chair receives a complaint,
which is to be submitted within twenty-four hours of the alleged violation, he
is to circulate a copy of the complaint among the group members and call a
meeting immediately. 0
Complaints are to be dealt with in meetings at the UNIFIL headquarters
in Naqura,51 a Lebanese town on the Mediterranean coast situated within
Israel's security zone several kilometers north of the Israeli border. The
protocol on the working rules stipulates that if the members of the Monitoring
Group determine that a complaint requires verification, representatives of the
member states will actually go into the field and examine evidence.52 In
verification missions within Lebanon, representatives of the United States,
France, Lebanon and Syria (if Syria desires) will participate, and
representatives of the United States, France and Israel will carry out
verification missions within Israel.53 The working rules also establish a
procedure for drafting a report dealing with complaints, a task that is to be
completed within seventy-two hours of the submission of a complaint.5 4
VI. THE CONFLICT UNDER THE APRIL AGREEMENT
By all accounts, the April Agreement achieved relative success in
limiting the number of civilian casualties in northern Israel and southern
Lebanon. Several former delegates to the ILMG have told the author that the
Agreement reduced civilian casualties. In the opinion of one former delegate
to the ILMG, the existence of the Agreement and the complimentary
Monitoring Group resulted in "a dramatic decrease in the number of civilian
casualties in the conflict."55 Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of
49. Id.
50. Id. art. I.E. See infra Appendix A.
51. Id. art. 3.A. See infra Appendix A. While the document states that the meetings are to be
held in Naqura, it is clear that participation in the meetings is limited to the five member states and that
UNIFIL representatives will not take part.
52. Id. art. 3.B & 3.C. See infra Appendix A.
53. Id. art 3.C. See infra Appendix A.
54. Id. art. 3.E. See infra Appendix A.
55. Interview with anonymous diplomat (May 15, 2000). The fact that there was a notable
decrease in casualties was corroborated in additional interviews with anonymous sources carried out on
April 14, 2000 and August 2, 2000. On the occasion of the Agreement's one year anniversary, Israel's
military delegate to the Monitoring Group told a reporter:
You can look at this as a great success. For a whole year, the residents of the north
have not been frightened about Katyushas being fired on them.... It is having an
effect. You can see it on the ground. If you count how many Israeli civilians were
injured a year before the Grapes of Wrath and then count how many have been
wounded this year... I think none. On the other side there is a big reduction of
civilians or soldiers wounded in military clashes. No doubt about it.
Arieh O'Sullivan, Against All Odds, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at 8. Similarly, in December of
1996 Lebanese diplomatic sources publicly stated that "the number of casualties and the number of
shells fired by Israel has drastically fallen since the ILMG started its mission." Beirut Radio Lebanon
(Lebanon), Foreign Ministry Comments on ILMG Meeting, Dec. 12, 1996, FBIS-NES-96-241,
20021
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Hesbollah, has also conceded the success of the Agreement at reducing
civilian casualties, telling a reporter, "Despite our annoyance with the
continuing Israeli violations, the Understanding did curb the attacks on
civilians." 5 Furthermore, the Monitoring Group itself has also expressed the
sentiment that the Agreement along with its own work reduced the risk to
civilians in Lebanon and Israel.
57
It is difficult to measure accurately the Agreement's success in reducing
the level of civilian casualties. Sheer comparison of figures would not be a
very meaningful exercise since the scope and nature of the fighting have
evolved since 1996. Hesbollah forces became increasingly well-armed and
increasingly effective, thus drawing the IDF into more frequent and more
violent exchanges over the course of the April Agreement's existence. Given
that the intensity of the firepower deployed on both sides increased
considerably over the course of the Agreement's duration, one would have to
consider it a substantial achievement that the level of civilian casualties did
not see a comparable rise. In particular, during the four years of the
Agreement's duration no single incident even approached the disastrous
proportions of Qana, where upwards of 100 civilians were killed in a single
exchange of fire. 58 Thus, while it is impossible to know what the civilian
death toll would have been in its absence, one can confidently concur with the
diplomats and generals cited above that the April Agreement reduced the
number of civilian casualties in the Lebanon conflict.
A. Legal Currency
As a result of its success in reducing civilian casualties, the April
Agreement achieved a real currency among the parties to the conflict in south
Lebanon. In public remarks on the conflict, political and military leaders in
Lebanon and Israel referred to the April Agreement constantly. In February
2000, for example, Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss conducted an
interview with an Arab news network that dealt extensively with the April
Agreement. 59 Similarly, in Israel public officials spoke about nearly every
incident in Lebanon in the context of the Agreement, and the Israeli political
arena entertained vociferous debate as to the merits of the Agreement.60
available at http://wnc.fedworld.gov.
56. AI-Safir (Beirut), Nasrallah Interviewed on ILMG, U.S. Policy, Jan. 31, 1997, FBIS-
NES-97-020, available at http://wnc.fedworld.gov.
57. The Monitoring Group's statement of January 8, 1997 reads in part, "Concluding its first
meeting in 1997, the Monitoring Group noted that the April 26, 1996 Understanding and the work of the
Group thus far have contributed to a reduction of risks to civilians." ILMG Statement 9, Jan. 8, 1997.
All ILMG statements are on file with the author.
58. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
59. Prime Minister al-Hoss spoke candidly about what he sees as the relative merits of the
Agreement. Lebanon 's al-Huss on "Resistance," ILMG, Arab Support, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION,
Feb. 20,2000.
60. See, for example, a disparaging Op-ed article by Likud Knesset member Ruby Rivlin.
Ruby Rivlin, The Golan Card, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at 8. See also comparable pieces by
Likud leader and previous Defense Minister Moshe Arens. Moshe Arens, Barak's First Mistake,
HA'ARETZ (English Edition), July 27, 1999, available at http//:www.haaretzdaily.com; Moshe Arens,
Driving Everyone Crazy, HA'ARETZ (English Edition), Feb. 22, 2000, available at
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Discussion of the April Agreement also played a role in the Israeli debate on
withdrawal from Lebanon.61 Nor was the public discussion of the April
Agreement conducted at a superficial level--on the contrary, both officials
and citizens consistently demonstrated an ability and a willingness to consider
62the intricacies of the Agreement. In addition to public statements by
Lebanese and Israeli officials, Hesbollah leaders also referred openly to the
Agreement and, on occasion, publicly responded to statements released by the
Monitoring Group.63 The Agreement emerged as a point of reference for other
countries as well. 64
The April Agreement and the Monitoring Group also gained touchstone
status among the civilians of south Lebanon. In November 1997, when shells
hit the village of Beit Leif and killed eight citizens, the Israeli government
blamed the Shi'ite militia Amal for the attack and issued a complaint to the
Monitoring Group. After the Lebanese government declined to file a formal
complaint of its own, several hundred residents of south Lebanon protested
against the government. The protest was held outside the UNIFIL compound
in Naqura where a meeting of the Monitoring Group was taking place at the
same time, and among the protesters' demands was that they be given a
chance to meet with the group.
65
The Agreement's strong currency was likely related to its relatively long
existence in some way. It is difficult to sort out cause and effect-did the
Agreement's international currency keep the parties paying homage to it or
did their continued homage give it its currency? No doubt the causal effect
worked in both directions. The important point is that, despite the fact that it
was initially intended as a temporary measure to defuse a crisis and was
http//.www.haaretzdaily.com.
61. In an opinion article which he titled with an allusion to the April Agreement, prominent
Labor Knesset member Yossi Beilin argued in favor of a unilateral withdrawal and defended his
position, in part, by writing, "[U]nderstandings with the other side already exist [referring to the April
Agreement]. Yossi Beilin, Grapes of Wrath Model, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 21, 1997, at 10. The
Agreement also plays a central role in Beilin's book on the subject. BEILIN, supra note 42.
62. An Associated Press article, relating public statements by Israeli leaders after a clash in
Lebanon killed five Israeli soldiers, is representative: "Israeli military sources said Monday that
[Hesbollah] guerrillas mounted the ambush from a civilian area and fled back to it, therefore violating
the April Agreement. But Deputy Defense Minister On Orr said [Hesbollah] did not break its earlier
promises when it killed the soldiers Monday." Karin Laub, Peres: Israel Will Retaliate for Lebanon
Ambush-Eventually, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 10, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4427032.
63. When the Monitoring Group issued a statement regarding an Israeli complaint about a
roadside bombing in Lebanon, a Hesbollah representative publicly retorted, 'How could the Lebanese
delegate have agreed to the issuing of such a statement containing such confusion and such
language?... We lodge a protest against such language, and do not agree to any amendment of the
clauses of the April Understanding." Why Has Israel Reoccupied Arnoun?, MIDEAST MMROR, Apr. 21,
1999, at 7.
64. American, French, Egyptian and other world leaders often publicly urged the parties to
uphold the Agreement, and leaders of influential inter-governmental organizations spoke about events in
the Middle East in the context of the April Agreement. The Chair's statement concluding the G-7
summit of June 1996, for example, included the following exhortation: "We urge all parties to adhere to
the 26 April 1996 Understanding which restored calm along the Lebanese-Israeli border." G-7 Summit
Chair's Statement, Toward Greater Security and Stability in a More Cooperative World, June 29, 1996,
available at http:/www.state.gov/www/issuesleconomielsummitChair.html.
65. David Rudge, Shi'ites Protest Beit LeifShellings, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 27, 1997, at 3.
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viewed by many with skepticism, all of the parties to the conflict in south
Lebanon continued to honor the Agreement over a period of nearly four years.
As with the 1993 understanding, application was not achieved on a level
of 100 percent. Indeed, the Monitoring Group met 103 times during its
existence to deal with 607 violation complaints. Nonetheless, all of the parties
to the conflict continued to treat the Agreement as the expected norm of
behavior. During the Agreement's duration, leaders on both sides constantly
invoked it in denouncing attacks from the other side or in justifying attacks of
their own forces as within the bounds of permissible action. Moreover, the
very testing of the April Agreement may itself have played an important role
in solidifying the principles encapsulated in the convention as norms of
behavior. The repeated military encounters and the consequential diplomatic
exchanges in the forum of the Monitoring Group may be viewed as the
process through which the parties established the true normative value of
these principles.
B. Testing the Agreement in the Web of International Law
The parties occasionally responded to perceived violations of the April
Agreement with force, but such coercive reactions did not necessarily
undermine the agreement's validity and may, in fact, have strengthened it. As
it had under the unwritten 1993 understanding, Hesbollah at times responded
to collateral deaths of Lebanese civilians by launching Katyusha rockets at
Israeli population centers. Israeli forces often fired on civilian areas in
Lebanon when coming under fire from Hesbollah fighters within those areas.
In June of 1999 and February of 2000, the Israelis struck at civil infrastructure
targets in Lebanon after Hesbollah, according to Israeli claims, blatantly
violated the Agreement. These forceful responses in violation of the April
Agreement would appear to contravene the Law of Reprisals, which prohibits
such retaliatory attacks.
66
Representatives to the Monitoring Group may have sought to defend
such actions as justified under the April Agreement as, for example, the
Lebanese delegate did in July of 1997 when he attempted to legitimate the
firing of a Katyusha rocket into Israel by arguing that "the launching of the
Katyusha was linked to repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians" and
that "the Understanding aims at protecting all civilians equally."67 In response
to the Lebanese delegate's claim, the Monitoring Group "determined that the
action, whatever the motivation, was a violation of the April 26, 1996
Understanding. In the same vein, the group announced a clear policy a
month later when it released a press statement reading in part, "The Group
declared that the concept of retaliation upon civilian targets is inadmissible
and incompatible with the Understanding."
69
66. See First Additional Protocol, supra note 36, at art. 51(6).
67. ILMG Statement 22, July 17, 1997.
68. Id.
69. ILMG Statement 25, Aug. 23, 1997. The delegates issued this strong statement in
response to the deliberate shelling of Sidon by SLA forces. In the same press release, they also
"condemned" the deliberate launching of Katyusha rockets into Israel and termed the action a "serious
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Israeli officials have publicly defended the IDF and SLA's right to
return fire as a legitimate action of self-defense. The text of the April
Agreement itself seems to recognize the principle of self-defense, though it
does so with the important caveat that the right to self-defense should be
exercised "without violating [the] understanding." Israeli officials have also
pointed to a confidential side-letter issued by Secretary of State Christopher
when he initialized the April Agreement as legitimizing IDF actions against
Hesbollah forces operating within civilian areas. The letter includes a passage
that reads:
The United States understands that if Hezbollah or another group in Lebanon acts
contrary to the understandings or attacks Israeli forces in Lebanon, whether this attack
involves firing weapons, an ambush, suicide missions, roadside explosive devices or
another form of attack, Israel has the right, in response, to take appropriate defensive
actions against the armed forces which perpetrated the attack. Regarding the prohibition
against using certain areas to launch attacks from, the United States understands that the
prohibition does not relate only to attacks involving the firing of weapons, but also to the
use of these areas by armed groups as a base to carry out those activities.
70
Israeli officials have read the passage broadly, arguing that it endorses
the IDF's right to fire on civilian areas if such action is necessary for self-
defense. Whether these reprisals violated the April Agreement and/or the Law
of Reprisals, they do not seem to have deprived the Agreement of its
authoritative force. Indeed, the practice of responding to breaches of the
Agreement with retaliatory attacks may have been necessary to some extent to
ensure that the parties perceived that the Agreement was backed up with a
coercive threat. This threat may have lent the Agreement greater credibility.71
While one might lament the damage and suffering these reprisals exacted
upon civilians in each specific incident, one cannot argue that the occurrence
of such attacks reflects a general disregard of the Agreement. On the contrary,
all sides understood such actions, whether their own or those of their
adversary, as deliberate moves to publicly assert and reinforce the authority of
the Agreement.
Military actors, especially on the Israeli side, did complain that the
Agreement burdened their forces with excessively heavy restrictions. But
despite occasional noises of discontent both sides continued to abide by the
Agreement and apparently perceived their antagonists to be honoring it as
well. 72 Except for a brief renunciation by a departing Israeli government, both
violation of the Understanding." The delegates also condemned the firing of Katyushas into Israel in
their statement of July 13, 1999, in which they also condemned the Israeli strikes on Lebanese civil
infrastructure of the preceding month, and branded the actions violations of the Agreement. See ILMG
Statement 85, July 13, 1999.
70. Bar'el, supra note 28.
71. In this vein, consider statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak after Israeli
raids on Lebanese power stations in February 2000. Barak announced: "Our operation yesterday is
intended to signal to the Lebanese Government, to the Hezbollah and indirectly even to the Syrians that
Israel is not ready to accept unilateral violations of this agreement and we will do whatever it takes to
defend our citizens." Barak Says He Will Do Whatever Necessary to Protect Israelis, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Feb. 8,2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
72. In their periodic briefings of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Israeli
military leaders have told the political leaders that Hesbollah has abided by the Agreement. See, e.g.,
Liat Collins, Shahak Warns Palestinian Anger Is Rising, JERusALEM PosT, May 21, 1997, at 1; Gideon
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Israel and Lebanon remained party to the April Agreement from its inception
in April 1996 until at least February 2000, and all parties to the conflict
continuously (though not always consistently) honored it during this period.73
VII. THE ISRAEL-LEBANON MONITORING GROUP AS A JUDICIAL INSTITUTION
A. Logistics and Procedure
In thinking about the role that the April Agreement and the ILMG
played in shaping the situation in south Lebanon in the last four years, one
must be careful to distinguish between the convention and the mechanism.
While the mechanism, the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, existed solely to
monitor the application of the convention, it is a distinct entity deserving of
examination as a unique international institution.
Including three initial meetings at which additional procedural rules
were discussed, the Monitoring Group met 103 times74 to deal with
complaints by Lebanon or Israel. At one of the initial meetings, the delegates
to the Monitoring Group agreed on a standard form for submitting complaints
to the Chair's office. 7  After a complaint was submitted, the headquarters
arranged for a meeting of the Monitoring Group as soon as was logistically
possible.
76
Because of the complicated logistics of getting to and departing from the
UNIFIL compound, the delegates did not return to their countries in the
middle of ILMG meetings, which were often marathon sessions of four days
Alon, IDF Chief Seeks OK to Hit Villages, HA'ARETZ (English Edition), Feb. 16, 2000, available at
http//:www.haaretzdaily.com.
73. The Israeli renunciation, in the final days of the lame duck Netanyahu government, may
actually serve to demonstrate the strength of the April Agreement. Even the Netanyahu government,
whose main participants were openly critical of the Agreement from its inception, was not able to
renounce the Agreement until it was a basically meaningless action. Netanyahu's government
announced its intention not to be bound by the April Agreement in its final days when it was clear that
the incoming Barak government would immediately reenter the convention. One should note that Syria
briefly boycotted the Monitoring Group, but the move was a temporary political stand intended to show
solidarity with the Arab League, not a calculated decision not to abide by the April Agreement. See
David Rudge, Syria Apparently Boycotting Monitoring Committee, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 4, 1997, at
20.
74. This figure also includes two meetings in May and June of 1999 that were convened for
the purpose of considering the same set of complaints. The Israeli delegation reportedly left the first
meeting in order to consult with the Israeli government, but the delegates convened another meeting
twelve days later to finish their business. The author has chosen to consider these as two separate
meetings. See ILMG Statement 80, May 20, 1999; ILMG Statement 81, June 1, 1999.
75. Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 2, 2000). This form apparently standardized
the procedure for submitting complaints and specified what information-i.e., time, place, description of
violation-was needed in order to process and consider each complaint.
76. The July 12, 1996 Protocol on the Working Rules for the ILMG stipulates that upon the
submission of a complaint the Chair will call for a meeting "immediately." ILMG Working Rules, art.
L.E. See infra Appendix A. A review of the Monitoring Group's public statements shows that in practice
there was a wide variance in the amount of time between the submission of complaints and the
convening of meetings to consider them. Sometimes meetings were convened within twenty-four to
forty-eight hours after the receipt of a complaint, while in other cases complaints were considered as
long as two weeks after they were submitted. Logistical constraints probably explain the variance in the
group's response time.
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or more. After late night talks, the delegates rested for a few hours in the
conference room or in sparse sleeping rooms at the UNIFIL compound.
Initially, as stipulated by the July 12, 1996 protocol on procedural rules,
the delegates to the Monitoring Group planned to carry out visits to inspect
the sites of alleged violations of the Agreement However, except for two such
exercises early in the group's existence,77 it did not implement on-sight
inspections. Some representatives have pointed the finger at the other side as
the party blocking the inspections, while other representatives have told the
author that there simply was no consensus among the parties that such
missions should be carried out.
78
While army generals led the Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian delegations,
diplomatic officers led the American and French delegations. The Israeli,
Lebanese and Syrian generals were supported by a representative of their
diplomatic corps at the ambassadorial level as well as a military representative
knowledgeable about events in the field who could present or rebut evidence.
The Israeli delegation also included an officer from the International Law
Branch of the JiDF Judge Advocate General's Office. The composition of the
American and French delegations was less consistent, with each team usually
comprised of four to six representatives. An army general and a State
Department or Foreign Ministry officer supported the diplomatic leader, with
various aides and secretaries also present to assist in logistics.
The delegates to the Monitoring Group sat at a large oval table in a
conference room at the UNIFIL compound. As might be expected from such a
complicated diplomatic exercise, a fixed seating arrangement was established
by an initial agreement.79 The Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian representatives
spoke to each other through the mediation of the American and French
representatives rather than directly. Delegates from both Israel and Lebanon
have said that the meetings were tense but professional.80
When a complaint was raised for discussion at an ILMG meeting, the
first order of business was the presentation of a showing of technical evidence
by the parties. The delegates arrived at the meetings with bomb fragments,
aerial and regular photographs, maps, video recordings and other technical
data to support or refute complaints. An excerpt from a news report on one of
the group's meetings may be instructive as to how the delegates carried out
these evidentiary displays: "The Monitoring Group saw a video film which
showed shells being fired from a vehicle close to a house in Majdal Salim.
The vehicle was destroyed a few moments later by an air-to-ground missile
fired by an Israel Air Force (LAF) helicopter gunship, the IDF Spokesman
77. ILMG Statement 5, Oct. 18, 1996; ILMG Statement 7, Dec. 12, 1996.
78. Interview with anonymous diplomat (May 15, 2000); Interview with anonymous
diplomat (Aug. 2, 2000); Interview with anonymous Major and First Lieutenant of the IDF Judge
Advocate General's Office (Aug. 10, 2000).
79. The Chair of the meeting sat at the head of the table with his colleagues. On his left sat
either the American or French delegation (whichever was not chairing the meeting), then the Syrian
delegation, the Lebanese delegation and the Israeli delegation, in that order. See Interview with
anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14,2000); Interview with anonymous diplomat (May 15,2000).
80. See Interview with anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14, 2000); Interview with anonymous
diplomat (May 15,2000); Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 10, 2000).
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said." 81 Monitoring Group delegates report that the military representatives
often quickly reached consensus as to whether a given complaint was
legitimate or not, as the technical evidence was often conclusive.
82
Once the technical evidence was discussed, the diplomatic
representatives began to formulate the group's confidential report and its
public statement, always composed in English. ILMG delegates have said that
the process of writing the text of the statement consumed the bulk of the
meeting time, as the diplomatic representatives negotiated the carefully
crafted document for hours on end. Because the group voted by consensus, a
single holdout on a single word could stall the process indefinitely.
The working rules of the Monitoring Group call for it to draw up a
report within seventy-two hours of the submission of a complaint. 84 The group
did not adhere to this rule because of logistical challenges, though this
deviation was apparently agreed upon by consensus. Delegates to the group
report that the process became more streamlined with time, as they gained
trust in one another and adopted agreed-upon wordings for particular types of
incidents.
The reader will see below that, as they became more comfortable with
the institution, Israel and Lebanon both increased the number of complaints
they submitted to the ILMG. Yet despite the increased volume, the
Monitoring Group generally shortened the length of its meetings over time. As
they gained experience, the delegates dealt with a larger number of complaints
per day of meeting. While the delegates were able to handle an average of one
complaint per day of meeting in 1996, by 2000, they had raised this figure to
an average of fourteen complaints.86
The drafting process was not a simple procedure. The first step of the
process, that of writing the confidential internal report, was simpler than
drafting the group's press release. During deliberations concerning the
complaints, delegates always spoke from a written text. After finishing his
statement, the delegate would hand the text to the Chair. The collection of the
written statements served as a basis upon which to formulate the internal
report, which read like a kind of executive summary of the proceedings. The
81. David Rudge, Grapes of Wrath Monitoring Group: IDF, SLA Responsible for Civilian
Death, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 22, 1998, at 5. See also David Rudge, IDF Colonel Wounded in Zone,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 28, 1997, at 3 ("Israel's representative to the Monitoring Group submitted
fragments of a mortar round which hit the village. Writing on it showed that it was made by Iran's
military industries."); Interview with anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14, 2000); Interview with anonymous
diplomat (May 15, 2000); Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 10, 2000).
82. Interview with anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14,2000); O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 8.
83. According to a diplomat who took part in the meetings of the ILMG, the diplomatic
representatives would consult English, French, Arabic and Hebrew dictionaries as well as dual-language
dictionaries in their efforts to find agreeable words. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 8. See Interview with
anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14, 2000). See also Interview with anonymous diplomat (May 15, 2000);
Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 10, 2000).
84. ILMG Working Rules, art. 3.E. See infra Appendix A.
85. Interview with anonymous Major and First Lieutenant of the IDF Judge Advocate
General's Office (Aug. 10, 2000).
86. Numbers compiled by author from the ILMG statements, dividing the number of complaints
handled at each meeting by the number of days the parties met.
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texts of the statements themselves were attached to this internal report as an
appendix along with copies of the violation forms submitted for the meeting.
After drawing up the internal report, the Chair turned to the more
complicated task of composing the public statement. The Chair wrote and
circulated a draft of a public statement among the parties so that they could
present him with separate comments on it.87 After revising the draft according
to the parties' demands, the Chair resubmitted it to the parties for further
criticism. This process repeated itself over and over again until the parties had
reached consensus on the text of the public statement.
The Monitoring Group's statements aimed at resolving the complaints
that had been submitted. As the reader will observe below, although the group
was often unable to determine whether or not a complained-of action
constituted a violation of the April 26, 1996 Agreement, it frequently did
make such a determination. Furthermore, even in cases in which the group
could not decisively state whether the action at hand constituted a breach of
the Agreement, it often issued some statement putting forth findings of fact.
One should note that the Monitoring Group was not armed with any sanction
power beyond the public condemnation that it could deliver through its public
statements. However, this ability to release a widely disseminated report
condemning the actions of any given party and endorsed by that party itself
did endow the Monitoring Group with a substantial sanction. Thus, the Israel-
Lebanon Monitoring Group served as a kind of arbitral or judicial institution,
commissioned by the member states to issue authoritative findings of fact and
resolve disputes between Israel and Lebanon regarding the application of the
April Agreement.
The ILMG delegates' task of resolving these disputes must have been
made considerably more difficult by the fact that the IDF and Hesbollah both
subscribe to military doctrines that call for constant review and modification
of military tactics. With both forces often changing the nature of their day-to-
day field operations during the Monitoring Group's existence, the delegates
were forced to repeatedly consider new types of incidents and how to deal
with them. 8 One wonders not only how the constant changes in military
tactics may have affected the work of the Monitoring Group, but also,
conversely, how the April Agreement played a role in influencing these
tactical changes.89
87. Delegates to the ILMG report that the procedure changed somewhat over time and that
sometimes the drafting was done in a more group-like fashion, without each party retiring to a separate
room. Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 10, 2000).
88. Commenting on how the constant changes in tactics complicated the Monitoring Group's
work, an IDF lawyer who participated in the meetings stated:
Both sides were constantly changing tactics and this made the committee's work more
challenging. The delegates had periods, for example, when they were dealing mostly with mines.
Then there might be a period with many complaints about the firing of anti-tank weapons. The
delegates would then have to start from scratch in determining how to deal with the complaints,
what is legitimate and what is not.
Interview with an anonymous Major and First Lieutenant of the IDF Judge Advocate General's Office
(Aug. 10, 2000).
89. Israeli Brigadier-General David Tzur has speculated that in its first year of existence the
Agreement caused Hesbollah to rely more heavily on roadside bomb ambushes and anti-tank attacks and
less on mortar and other heavy fire. See O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 8.
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Notwithstanding several instances in which the Monitoring Group was
unable to agree as to whether it had jurisdiction to hear certain types of
complaints, the group seems generally to have dealt effectively with most
issues it faced. It is noteworthy that a group consisting of delegates from five
countries, each with its own distinct agenda and three of which have been
embroiled in a hot military conflict for the better part of the past two decades,
was able to function so effectively. Such effective and efficient work is
unusual in international institutions in general, let alone under the specific
circumstances in the case at hand. Perhaps one explanation for the group's
relative success is the relation between its work and public international law.
The ILMG applied only a single body of law-the April Agreement between
Israel and Lebanon. The group was not competent to resolve complaints based
upon violations of public international law in general. The delegates thus dealt
with a small, well-defined body of law that they were able to handle adeptly.
Furthermore, the procedural style of the group's meetings was more akin
to a military meeting than an adversarial legal forum. The delegates concerned
themselves with sorting out events on the ground and trying to ensure that the
situation would stay under control. The delegates did not, for example, turn to
public international law to settle arguments about the proper definition of a
"civilian populated area" under the April Agreement. Had they done so, it is
unlikely that the military officers leading the Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian
delegations would have been moved. These men, with their years of military
experience, understood what was acceptable under the convention and would
not be interested in legal pontification. They could communicate with one
another on a simpler, more practical level and adjust the rules of the system as
they saw fit, without recourse to legal theory or outside bodies of law.90
This functional focus does not mean that the ILMG was not a legal
institution. On the contrary, from the perspective of the New Haven scholar,
the ILMG was a quintessential legal institution, settling disputes between
conflicting parties, issuing decisions that carried a considerable sanction
power based in public castigation and establishing the norms of behavior for
the ongoing conflict. There can be no doubt that the activity of the Israel-
Lebanon Monitoring Group substantially affected the behavior of the parties
to the conflict in Lebanon. Indeed, it interpreted and reinforced the norms that
informed expectations on all sides regarding acceptable behavior in the
conflict. The fact that the participants in the ILMG's adjudication process
framed their arguments in terms of the real-life events in the field rather than
theories of international law in no way diminishes the legal character of the
institution, and in fact may have been an important factor enabling it to
effectively carry out its work as a legal institution.
90. In this respect, Jonathan Schwartz, Deputy Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of
State, has commented:
The Monitoring Group was intended to be a very streamlined organization that could
react quickly to alleged violations of the cease-fire. Military representatives comprise
the group. It is not a lawyers' forum for debating technicalities but rather one in
which military experts from the five countries-Israel, Lebanon, Syria, France and
the United States-can discuss alleged violations and decide how to respond.
Jonathan Schwartz, Insider Briefing: Public International Law, 91 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 27 (1997).
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B. Fostering Adherence to the Legal Convention
The Monitoring Group's single stated function was to monitor the
parties' adherence to the April Agreement. The establishment of a committee
to consider complaints of violations of the convention endowed the
Agreement with day-to-day salience. The very act of periodically meeting to
review each side's performance under the Agreement seems to have lent the
written text of the convention greater force. Group members, knowing that
they would have to meet repeatedly with the same delegates and defend their
state's actions had incentives to try to persuade authorities in their country to
abide by the Agreement. More importantly, knowing that the Monitoring
Group would release a statement at the end of each session and that news
media worldwide would have an opportunity to examine both sides'
adherence to the Agreement, the states' leaders had incentives for compliance.
Furthermore, while both sides occasionally expressed frustration at the other's
perceived indifference to violations, the possibility of discussing violations
and working to reduce them may have given the parties greater faith in the
potential of the Agreement to restrain their adversary's actions. In this respect,
the Monitoring Group has itself noted "the important role the Group can play
in protecting civilians by building mutual restraint, diffusing tensions, and
preventing escalation." 91 The dynamics that made the Monitoring Group an
effective mechanism for enhancing each side's performance are difficult to
define. In fact, in some sense it may have been just the perception that the
Monitoring Group would have such an effect that caused it to be effective. In
any event, both the individual delegates to the Monitoring Group,92 and the
group in its institutional capacity,93 have repeatedly expressed the opinion that
the JLMG enhanced application of the written Agreement.
91. ILMG Statement 72, Mar. 2, 1999.
92. Interview with anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14, 2000); Interview with anonymous
diplomat (May 15, 2000). Ui Lubrani, Israel's longtime coordinator on Lebanon, expressed this view
when he told a reporter,
I think we have to be very vigorous in our contacts with the Monitoring Group so that
it will do whatever is necessary in order to get the other side to adhere fully to the
understandings. We have to find ways of proving our case as clearly and
unequivocally as possible and in this way put pressure on Syria and the Lebanese
government to ensure that the understandings are upheld.
David Rudge, Mordechai: We Rill Stick To Grapes of Wrath Understandings, JERusALEM PosT, Oct.
28, 1997, at 20.
93. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 50, June 23, 1998 ("[T]he [Monitoring] Group... noted that
the positive and responsible conduct of both sides in presenting and evaluating evidence and in drawing
appropriate conclusions highlights the Group's effective role in protecting civilians and reducing
tensions in the region.").
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Table I: Comparison of Israeli and Lebanese Complaints
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# oflsraeli Complaints








Just as the April Agreement, over time, gained currency with the parties
to the conflict, so too did the Monitoring Group gain a certain stature with the
member states as they became increasingly familiar with the institution. A
former delegate has said that as the parties recognized the ILMG's ability to
lend complaints an air of authenticity and significance, a competition
developed between Israel and Lebanon to stay even with one another in terms
of the number of complaints each was submitting to the group.94 The graph
above illustrates that the parties did indeed track one another extremely
closely in their submission of complaints.
Of course, one might explain the graph above by arguing that each party
just happened to experience roughly the same number of violations in each
month of the April Agreement's duration or that because the parties retaliated
against violations inflicted on themselves with violations of their own, the
figures on the two sides mirrored one another. Several diplomats have
indicated, however, that some sense of competition also shaped the graph
above.95 The parties' concern with the relative number of complaints each
submitted to the Monitoring Group, as reflected in the graph, demonstrates the
significant faith they placed in the power and meaning of the Monitoring
Group.
94. Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 2, 2000).
95. Interview with anonymous diplomat (May 15, 2000); Interview with anonymous
diplomat (Aug. 2, 2000).
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The graph also illustrates another noteworthy trend over time in the
parties' use of the Monitoring Group mechanism. With the passage of time,
the parties seem to have become increasingly comfortable with the institution
and increasingly willing to turn to the group when they felt they had been
wronged by their adversary.
96
VIII. ILMG PUBLIC STATEMENTS-RECORDING A JURISPRUDENCE
For scholars and observers of the April Agreement and the Israel-
Lebanon Monitoring Group, the 103 public statements generated by the
Monitoring Group are an invaluable resource. The statements deserve special
scrutiny as the group's sole official public record. When combined with
additional information gleaned from interviews and public sources, an
analysis of the ILMG's statements reveals much about how the Monitoring
Group conducted its work.
A critical analysis of the group's statements reveals much not only about
how the Monitoring Group worked, but also about why it worked-why it
served as such an effective mechanism for encouraging the parties to adhere to
the Agreement and why the parties so actively participated in the group for so
long. The statements, which were released to media organizations worldwide,
carried enough of an authoritative voice to push the parties towards
compliance with their 1996 pledges. The Monitoring Group was able to assign
responsibility for specific actions to one party or another and to condemn
events that harmed civilians in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. But
because the parties crafted the press releases through a joint and consensual
drafting process, they were able to control the content of the statements
enough to protect themselves from an unbearable level of castigation and
public criticism. This drafting process resulted in statements whose messages
were delivered with the subtlety and grace necessary for such a delicate
diplomatic exercise. Thus the parties were able to release announcements
96. Interview with anonymous Chair of the ILMG (Nov. 24, 2000). One should note that
while the Monitoring Group did, by most accounts, serve as a relatively successful tool to increase
application of the April Agreement and to allow communication between Israel, Syria and Lebanon, it
was not able to expand its usefulness to achieve other objectives, nor was it able to agree on an
expansion of the 1996 Agreement itself Israel reportedly proposed to the Monitoring Group that the
April Agreement be expanded to include a prohibition on the use of roadside bombs, but Lebanon and
Syria rejected the proposal. Israeli Plan for Ban on Roadside Bombs in Lebanon Rejected, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRBSSE, Sept. 15, 1997, LEXIS, News Group File. Likewise, an American idea to use the
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group to create a military hotline between Israel, Syria and Lebanon
apparently failed, as did proposals to expand the Monitoring Group into a mechanism to monitor an
Israeli-Lebanese agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. See US Tries To Set Up Israel-Syria
"Hot Line," AGENCE FRANCE-PR.Ssn, Nov. 13 1997, LEXIS, News Group File; Lebanese Premier
Against Changing HLMG Form, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Nov. 6. 1999. The failure of the
Monitoring Group to expand its role or to expand the April Agreement demonstrates its limited and
confined purpose. The group could effectively serve as a monitoring mechanism to increase adherence
to the April Agreement and lower the prospects of all-out war without evolving into a cure-all multi-
purpose institution. The fact that other functions were not added to the group's mandate reflects the non-
essential value of these functions, rather than any inherent disability in the group itself. The parties
remained faithful to the Agreement and the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group without expanding either
the convention or the mechanism because they fulfilled their limited but crucial functions in their
original forms.
2002]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
which, while robust enough to serve as a disincentive to misconduct, were
sterilized enough to allow the parties to continuously and actively participate
in the group's deliberations.
The July 12, 1996 protocol on the working rules of the Israel-Lebanon
Monitoring Group allows for two options in regards to the group's reporting
function. If there is unanimity among members of the group, the working rules
stipulate that the report "will identify the party responsible for not complying
with the understanding, will address and deal with the situation and will
contain recommendations for enhancing compliance with the understanding."
If there is no unanimity, the rules provide that the report "will contain a
description of the Monitoring Group's discussions of the complaint and the
results of the verification mission, and the matter will be referred to the
Foreign Ministers for follow-up." 97 A review of the record shows that in
practice the delegates settled on a kind of hybrid path between these two
approaches. The delegates authored a confidential internal report at the end of
each meeting that summarized the events of the meeting and recorded the
arguments presented by each side. In addition, as they agreed to do at their
first meeting,98 they unanimously or consensually99  released a public
statement at the end of each meeting which fell somewhere between the two
options envisioned by the working rules in terms of its substantive resolution
of the dispute at hand. While the delegates seem never to have referred an
issue to their foreign ministers,100 they often failed to "identify the party
responsible for not complying with the understanding." Many of the group's
press releases simply reviewed the claims made by the parties and
acknowledged that the delegates were not able to agree on an apportionment
of responsibility or culpability between the parties, but did so unanimously.
The public statements issued by the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group
comprise a truly unique and remarkable set of documents. During its nearly
four years of existence the group dealt with a tremendous variety of issues and
created a fascinating historical record. Like fact-finding judges of a court of
law, the delegates to the Monitoring Group have endowed scholars and the
public at large with a set of decisions that together form a body of instructive
97. ILMG Working Rules, art. 3.E. See infra Appendix A.
98. ILMG Statement 1, Aug. 8, 1996.
99. The working rules speak of "unanimity" among the parties, but as Rotem Giladi has
pointed out, in practice the group's decision-making process may more accurately be termed
"consensual." While unanimity implies the requirement of an affirmative vote of approval, consensus
implies the less stringent requirement of the absence of formal objection. See Giladi, supra note 42, at
379 & n.107.
100. One delegate has reported that the Monitoring Group did refer issues to the foreign
ministers of the member states on three occasions, but other delegates have said that the group never
referred an issue to the parties' foreign ministers. However, even the delegate who insisted that the
group had passed matters up to the foreign ministers related that such a move implied only telephone
calls between Washington or Paris and Jerusalem and between the western capitals and Beirut or
Damascus, not an actual meeting of foreign ministers or even a direct phone call between the Israeli and
Lebanese or Syrian foreign ministers. All of the delegates agreed that political considerations, rather
than lack of opportunity, explain the non-use of this option. While the delegates faced issues which they
could not resolve as a group, they were not able to refer such matters to the foreign ministers due to
political exigencies that would not allow the foreign ministers to contact one another directly. Interview
with anonymous diplomat (Apr. 14, 2000); Interview with anonymous diplomat (May 15, 2000);
Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 2, 2000).
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jurisprudence. A student of the group's work can refer to this body of law for
guidance as to how the members of this institution evolved over time in their
thinking about particular issues and as to how the institution as a whole, a
conglomeration of five veto-enabled parties, developed over the course of the
conflict.
A. Increasing Competency
A review of the Monitoring Group's public statements shows that, over
the course of its existence, the group became increasingly able to determine
that a particular action constituted a violation of the April Agreement and to
apportion culpability for the incident. Whereas the group's early press releases
simply reviewed the claims put forth by each side and only sometimes stated
that one side or another was "responsible" for a given incident, the group's
later announcements often directly proclaimed that one side had committed a
particular action in "violation" of the 1996 Agreement. As the reader will see
in the discussion below, the group's tendency towards greater competence to
assign blame allowed it to transform its jurisprudence on particular issues.
Thus, for example, while in its early existence the Monitoring Group handled
claims of exchanges of fire to and from civilian areas by merely repeating the
principles encapsulated in the April Agreement, in its later years the group
was often able to assign culpability to a given party for such incidents.
Several factors seem to have propelled the group towards greater
competence. As one might expect, the governments of the five member states
approached their participation in this completely new and untried institution
with utmost caution in the summer of 1996. As the parties became more
familiar with the workings of the mechanism and observed the results of the
group's work, they became willing to lend the institution more substantial
responsibility. As the reader has seen, this heightened level of comfort with
the Monitoring Group's work not only led the member states to allow the
group a stronger hand, but also led Israel and Lebanon to make complaints
more frequently. Furthermore, as the parties became increasingly comfortable
with the Monitoring Group mechanism, they may have been able to think
more about the longer term implications of the ILMG's jurisprudence and thus
become more willing to allow the group to establish specific principles of law
by finding one party culpable for a given incident. A former Chair of the
Monitoring Group has said that each party eventually recognized that if it
allowed the Monitoring Group to find it at fault in a given incident then the
principle thereby established would enable the group to find the other side at
fault if it committed the same action in the future.10 1
Undoubtedly, the Monitoring Group's trend towards greater competency
also reflects an increased level of comfort among the individual delegates to
the institution. Over time the delegates could be expected to have become
more familiar with their counterparts and to have developed routines of
dispute resolution. The delegates seem to have developed personal
101. Interview with anonymous Chair of the ILMG (Nov. 24,2000).
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relationships during the course of their work together, and their closer ties
may have facilitated the move towards greater competency as an institution.
Although the governments of the member states retained ultimate
control over the group's public statements, indeed over its very existence, the
institution may have developed a life of its own in some sense. Once a
member state had agreed to a certain outcome and a particular wording of the
public statement in a given case, it would be difficult for its delegation not to
allow a similar resolution in a similar case in the future even in circumstances
where it was the wrongdoer. This was especially true because the Chair and
Co-chair of the group cajoled the parties to maintain an even course. Thus, the
Monitoring Group slowly but steadily developed a body of jurisprudence that
was progressively more principled and more likely to find the parties guilty of
violating the April Agreement.
B. The Structure of the Statements
Because the group's statements evolved so much over time and because
they dealt with such a wide variety of issues, it is difficult to describe the
contents and language of a "typical" statement. 0 2 Nonetheless, the structure
of the press releases did follow a given pattern. Each statement opened with
an announcement that the Monitoring Group met on a particular day or
number of days in order to consider a given number of Israeli and Lebanese
complaints.103
The announcement then continued to present the various claims offered
by each party at the meeting. While both parties offered numerous and varied
complaints over the course of the Monitoring Group's existence (Israel
submitted 298 complaints; Lebanon submitted 309), Lebanese complaints
most often accused IDF or SLA forces of firing on civilian areas, and Israeli
complaints most often accused Hesbollah of firing from civilian areas or of
firing into southern Lebanese villages or Israeli territory. In presenting a
complaint, the press release often stated that the Monitoring Group had
accepted the occurrence of the underlying event (though not necessarily all of
its surrounding details) as factual. The Monitoring Group's press release of
September 29, 1997, for example, reported, "The Monitoring Group
acknowledged that in the village of Beit Yahun a civilian woman was
wounded in her leg and her home damaged in the course of a rocket attack by
a Lebanese armed group on a military position of forces cooperating with
Israel., 10 4 The factual reporting was often quite detailed, reflecting the
102. Although it is difficult to label any given statement as "typical," a sample statement is
attached to this Article as Appendix B in order to give the reader a better sense of what these
announcements entailed.
103. For example, the ILMG statement of January 12, 1998, begins with the following
paragraph:
The Monitoring Group met January 12, 1998 at the UNIFIL Headquarters compound
near Naqura, Lebanon to consider six complaints of violation of the April 26, 1996
Understanding, three filed by the Lebanese delegation on December 26, 1997,
January 5 and 8, 1998, and three by the Israeli delegation on January 5 and 9, 1998.
ILMG Statement 35, Jan. 12, 1998.
104. ILMG Statement 27, Sept. 29, 1997.
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precision of the technical evidence that the parties usually submitted.. For
example, the ILMG statement of July 7, 1998, read in part:
With regard to the Lebanese violation complaint, the Monitoring Group acknowledged
that on July 2, during the course of the military operations referred to above, five houses
in the village of Alta Ez Zott were damaged by 120 mm shells and 12.7 mm machine-gun
fire fired by Israeli military forces and those cooperating with them. In addition, two 81
mm rounds and four 120 mm rounds fired by the same units impacted in Haddatha,
damaging three houses.'0 5
After stating that the Monitoring Group had accepted a certain set of
circumstances as factual, or sometimes without making such an
announcement, the press release introduced the discussion of each submitted
complaint by reciting the claim put forth by a given party. In the case above,
in which the Monitoring Group acknowledged that a woman was wounded in
Beit Yahun, the delegates continued their composition of the press release by
relating, "The Israeli delegate stated that the home was one hundred meters
from the military target and that the attack was carried out from within the
village of Bara'shit, thus running counter to the Understanding in two
ways.
106
After presenting a claim of one of the parties, the statement usually
proceeded with the defense offered by the party against whom the complaint
was filed. According to the record as presented by the press statements, in
some rare cases the responding party did not, in fact, offer a defense. For
example, when Lebanon complained on July 12, 1997 that a Lebanese civilian
had been killed by IDF or SLA tank fire, according to the press release, "It]he
Israeli delegate stated that the farmer was mistaken for a member of a
Lebanese armed group and expressed deep sorrow for the death.' 10 7 However,
the party against whom the complaint was submitted usually did present some
sort of defense. Such a defense could assume many forms. Often the defense
presented a version of the same story with slightly changed facts and argued
that under this fact pattern no legitimate claim could be sustained. Thus, for
example, with regard to the Israeli complaint discussed in the preceding
paragraph, in which the Israeli delegation argued that the rocket attack was
launched from within a civilian area and impacted on a civilian area one
hundred meters from the intended military target, the press release presented
the Lebanese defense as follows:
The Lebanese delegate stated that the house was twenty meters from the military target,
that the military position of forces cooperating with Israel ought not be established so
close to civilian houses since positioning military units close to houses could endanger
civilians and that the attack did not ram counter to the Understanding since it was
launched from a safe distance away from civilian populated areas.
0 s
At some of the group's meetings, the parties seem to have presented
sharply different understandings of the same incident. For example, in relation
105. ILMG Statement 52, July 7, 1998.
106. ILMG Statement 27, supra note 104.
107. ILMG Statement 22, supra note 67.
108. ILMG Statement 27, supra note 104.
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to an Israeli complaint in January 1998 concerning a roadside bomb detonated
by Hesbollah, the ILMG announced,
The Monitoring Group acknowledged that on January 17, 1998 a roadside bomb placed
by a Lebanese armed group was detonated on a road near Yaroun, damaging a vehicle.
The Israeli delegate stated that the car was owned by a civilian who had used it daily, that
there was no military target in the area and that no precaution had bean taken in order to
avoid affecting civilians; hence it was a violation. The Lebanese delegate stated that the
target was an Israeli patrol, that no civilian had been affected, that the car was abandoned
and that complaints should not be filed regarding damages to abandoned property. He
added that there was no violation.'
0 9
In some rare instances, the delegates of the responding state did not deny
the facts as presented by the other party but simply maintained that they had
no information concerning the event at issue. At a meeting in May 1999, both
the Israeli and the Lebanese delegations offered this uncommon response.
After reporting a Lebanese claim that Israeli forces had fired on a civilian area
and a parallel Israeli claim that Lebanese forces had fired on a civilian area,
the ILMG press release noted, "In response to these violation complaints, the
Israeli and Lebanese delegates respectively stated they had no knowledge of
any firing at the times and places indicated by the other side."'1 0 The extreme
infrequency with which both Israel and Lebanon claimed a lack of knowledge
reflected a high level of information at top levels of the armed forces on both
sides of the conflict, a fact made apparent in the often detailed examinations
of evidence and determinations of fact."' However, while the evidence
presented was often quite extensive, in some few cases the responding party
argued in its defense that the evidence offered against it was unpersuasive and
that the claim should therefore be dismissed. For instance, in response to an
Israeli complaint presented at an ILMG meeting in January of 1998 that
Hesbollah had shelled a Lebanese village, "[t]he Lebanese delegate stated that
the Israeli delegation did not provide sufficient data for the complaint to be
accepted by the Group or to allow proper examination, and that the complaint
had no basis in its present form and content."
112
In some cases the responding party did not dispute the facts as presented
by the complaining party, but argued that such facts, even if taken as true,
would not constitute a basis for a legitimate complaint. Sometimes this type of
defense took the form of a claim that the complaint was trivial. For example,
in response to Israeli complaints about Hesbollah attacks to and from civilian
areas, the ILMG's press release of July 31, 1997 reported that "[t]he Lebanese
Delegation stated that the Israeli complaints dealt with events of limited
consequence and gravity. It added that Lebanon had refrained in the past from
filing complaints about such acts in order to preserve the credibility of the
Group.' 1 At other times, this type of defense took the form of a claim that
109. ILMG Statement 36, Jan. 21, 1998.
110. ILMG Statement 78, May 6, 1999.
111. The reciprocal proffering of this rarely used defense at a single meeting does, however,
lead to skepticism as to the genuineness of its submission or, alternatively, to the genuineness of the
complaints in this particular case.
112. ILMG Statement 36, supra note 109.
113. ILMG Statement 23, July 31, 1997.
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the action complained of, even if it was in fact committed by forces under the
responsibility of the responding party, did not constitute a violation of the
April Agreement, and that the complaint should thus be dismissed. In this
vein, when the Israeli delegation submitted a complaint that in the course of
shelling Israeli forces near the Israeli-Lebanese border, Hesbollah mistakenly
fired at least one shell over the border into Israeli territory and thereby
violated the April Agreement, the Monitoring Group reported that "[tlhe
Lebanese Delegation rejected this assertion and stated that all shells were fired
at a military target, that all but one shell impacted on Lebanese territory, and
that the attack was therefore consistent with the Understanding."
I 14
At times the responding party defended the actions of its forces by
putting forth a kind of affirmative defense. A party might argue, for example,
that the surrounding circumstances of a given event, such as the need to act in
self-defense, justified the actions taken by its forces. An ILMG statement
reports the following response to a Lebanese complaint that Israeli shelling
had led to civilian casualties and damage:
The Israeli representative expressed sorrow for the injuries and damage caused, but
maintained they were an unintended result of defensive counter-fire following a
Hizbollah mortar attack. He said Israel had responded in a proportionate and restrained
manner consistent with the recommendations of [sic] adopted by the Monitoring Group
on September 25. 
5
One should note that in attempting to provide an affirmative defense for the
Israeli action, the Israeli delegates contextualized their claim not only in
reference to the April Agreement but also in reference to the existing ILMG
jurisprudence. Because the Monitoring Group was more likely to condemn
reprisals than violations of the Agreement committed in self-defense, the
parties were less apt to argue that their actions were justified as retaliatory.
Nonetheless, the delegations did at times attempt to carve out such an
affirmative defense. When the Monitoring Group "accepted as factual that at
least one Katyusha rocket launched by a Lebanese armed group fell onto
Israeli territory," the Lebanese delegate defended the actions of the group by
arguing that "the launching of the Katyusha was linked to repeated Israeli
attacks on Lebanese civilians and that the Understanding aims at protecting all
civilians equally."
' 16
After presenting a claim and any defenses raised to that claim, public
statements issued by the ILMG continued by recording the finding of the
group, if it had been able to reach one, concerning the given claim. Often the
delegations were not able to reach consensus as to whether the disputed action
did take place as claimed or whether it constituted a violation of the April
Agreement, and thus they simply announced the claim and the defense
without stating any conclusion as to the merits of the complaint. In regard to
many complaints, however, and increasingly so with the Monitoring Group's
114. ILMG Statement 17, Apr. 30, 1997.
115. ILMG Statement 5, supra note 77.
116. ILMG Statement 22, supra note 67.
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lengthening tenure, the delegates were able to agree on whether the action
complained of constituted a violation of the April Agreement.
On some extremely rare occasions, the group affirmatively determined
by consensus that the complained-of action did not constitute a breach of the
April Agreement. For instance, in its press statement of August 12, 1997, the
Monitoring Group announced that "[w]ith respect to the Israeli complaint
regarding the incident at Aay, the Group accepted that the target was
military."' 1 7 More commonly, the delegates agreed that a complaint warranted
a finding of a violation of the Agreement. Tellingly, the delegates expressed
their findings of guilt in a variety of terms. Through their bargaining on the
exact language to be used in each case, the delegates were able to send subtle
messages about the level of culpability reflected in each case, or, more
correctly, the level of culpability that they were able to agree was reflected in
each case.
Consider, for example, the ILMG meeting of August 10-12, 1997.
Among the six complaints which they submitted prior to that meeting, the
Israelis submitted one complaint regarding a mortar round that overshot its
military target just inside Lebanon and landed within Israeli territory without
causing any damage and one complaint concerning a Katyusha rocket
deliberately fired at the Israeli town of Kiryat Shemona that injured a civilian
and caused property damage. In reference to the former complaint, the
delegates announced, "The Group acknowledged that this action, whether
intentional or not, fails to conform to the provisions of the Understanding...
* ." In reference to the latter complaint, the delegates announced, "[T]he Group
acknowledged it as a violation of the Understanding and condemned it."' 8
Clearly, the delegates to the ILMG coordinated on a much sterner response to
the latter action than to the former.
In some of their press releases, the delegates issued statements "strongly
condemning," as opposed to simply "condemning," the disputed action.119 In
other statements, the delegates announced that they "rejected"'120 or "strongly
rejected" 121 the action at issue. Often the delegates implemented language that
softened the finding of a violation and the assignment of blame. Thus, for
example, in their announcement of May 13, 1998, after branding several
actions as outright violations of the April Agreement, the delegates reported:
The Monitoring Group acknowledged that on May 11, 1998, a shell fired by a Lebanese
Armed Group in the course of an attack on military targets in Lebanon impacted on the
Israeli side of the Israeli-built fence and very near to it, northwest of Kibbutz Menara, in
what could be considered a violation of the Understanding.
122
117. ILMG Statement 24, Aug. 12, 1997.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 37, Feb. 6, 1998 ("The Group considered this attack a
violation of the Understanding and strongly condemned it and those who carried it out.").
120. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 25, Aug. 23, 1997 (rejecting the shelling of villages by SLA
forces and the firing of a Katyusha at a civilian area by Hesbollah).
121. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 18, May 8, 1997 (finding that placement of explosive devices
in a civilian area "violates the April 26, 1996 Understanding" and "strongly reject[ing] such action").
122. ILMG Statement 45, May 13, 1998 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, the delegates occasionally termed actions "unintentional
violations" of the April Agreement. 123 In yet another nuance of the level of
culpability that the Monitoring Group was able to assign, it sometimes
described actions as "possibly unintentional violations" of the Agreement.
Such language, which seems more condemnatory than that naming an action
as a purely "unintentional violation," was used, for example, in a case in
which Lebanon complained that Israel had "deliberate[ly] and
indiscriminate[ly]" shelled a poultry farm, killing two civilians and injuring
one, while Israel claimed that the "the casualties were the result of self-
defensive counterfire during the evacuation of wounded soldiers following a
military clash. ' 124 Other formulations that seem to imply less culpability than
a direct statement that the action considered was a "violation of the
Agreement," include findings that an action "ran counter to the
understanding"'12 and that an action was "in breach of the understanding.'
126
It is noteworthy that the Monitoring Group's statements often appeared
quite balanced in terms of their assignment of culpability. It seems that the
group was more likely to find one party guilty of a violation of the April
Agreement if it also found the other side guilty of a violation in the same
report. This balance makes sense in light of the veto wielded by each party to
the Monitoring Group over the institution's findings in the public report. Each
party would be more likely to accede to a finding against itself if its adversary
did the same. In this respect, one former delegate to the Monitoring Group
dismissed the possible criticism that the public reporting of the group's work
might have created a dynamic whereby Israel and Lebanon felt obligated to
submit complaints when either saw that the other had done so, just for the
sake of staying even in this arena. This delegate maintained that meetings at
which roughly equal numbers of complaints had been submitted ran more
smoothly than more asymmetric meetings, because "the equilibrating effect of
the evenness of the complaints created a better atmosphere and allowed us to
do better work."
127
One should note that the language the delegates used to assign
authorship of a given act left both sides of the conflict ample room to
maneuver in order to evade direct international condemnation and to deal with
the domestic consequences flowing from such condemnation. When the
Monitoring Group reported on a Lebanese complaint, it stated that the alleged
action had been committed by "Israeli forces or those cooperating with them."
Likewise, when it reported on an Israeli complaint, it referred to the
perpetrators of the protested action as "a Lebanese armed group." This loose
123. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 50, supra note 93 (finding that the detonation of a roadside
bomb which killed an SLA soldier and his young son constitutes an unintentional violation of the
understanding).
124. ILMG Statement 22, supra note 67.
125. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 53, July 21 1998 (finding that IDF or SLA firing ofshells into
a civilian area in response to Hesbollah missile launchings "ran counter to the Understanding").
126. See, e.g., ILMG Statement 10, Jan. 10, 1997 (finding that the launching of a Katyusha
rocket into Israel "was in breach of the April 26, 1996 Understanding and was calculated to undermine
it").
127. Interview with anonymous diplomat (Aug. 10, 2000).
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language enabled Israeli forces to share the burden of blame with SLA forces
and allowed the governments of Lebanon and Syria to avoid participation in
an explicit condemnation of a specifically named military group, let alone a
finding that either government had itself violated the Agreement in any
concrete way.
Significantly, when issuing a finding in regards to an action with no
established perpetrator, the Monitoring Group was likely to adopt its harshest
condemnatory language. For example, the ILMG press release of February 6,
1998 related the discussion of an Israeli complaint claiming that a specific
Lebanese armed group had detonated a roadside bomb in southern Lebanon,
killing a civilian. The press release reported that the Lebanese delegation
denied that the armed group had carried out the attack and suggested that it
could have been a "local initiative." The delegates then concluded their
reporting of the complaint by announcing that "The Group considered this
attack a violation of the Understanding and strongly condemned it and those
who carried it out. ' 128 Undoubtedly, the failure to assign blame to any
particular group allowed the delegates to coordinate on the strongly worded
condemnation. Lebanese and Syrian authorities would not feel, and would not
be made to feel, that they had betrayed any constituency since culpability for
the attack resided with an anonymous actor.
A similar dynamic seems to have been in effect in the few cases in
which Lebanese complaints were pointed at actions specifically attributed to
the SLA rather than the IDF. In such cases the Israeli delegation may have felt
less need to resist strongly condemnatory language, since the brunt of the
disparagement would fall upon the southern Lebanese rather than the Israelis.
In June of 1998, following a Hesbollah attack, SLA forces undertook a
shelling action in which several rounds fell within a Lebanese village,
inflicting property damage. At the conclusion of its meeting to consider the
Lebanese complaint regarding this incident, the Monitoring Group announced
that it "strongly criticized this violation of the Understanding and declared
once again that targeting civilian areas is inadmissible with the
Understanding." It also "welcomed the prompt action that was undertaken to
bring an end to the shelling and to discipline those immediately responsible
for the violation., 12 9 The message delivered in the announcement was subtly
stronger than that usually sent after such errant shellings. The Israeli
delegation may have seen an opportunity to win a measure of good will from
its counterparts by offering a concession in this case, since permitting the
sterner tone would not impinge directly on Israel.
After reviewing the complaints considered at a given meeting, the
delegates usually continued their announcements by stating or restating
relevant principles. Often, especially in cases in which the delegates could not
reach a consensus as to whether the April Agreement had been breached, the
delegates simply recited the principles enshrined in that document. In its press
statement of March 4, 1997, the Monitoring Group announced that it "by
128. ILMG Statement 37,supra note 119.
129. ILMG Statement 49, June 16, 1998.
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unanimity reaffirmed the obligation for all combatants to act strictly in
accordance with the Understanding of April 26, 1996, which prohibits attacks
from and on civilian populated areas.' ' ° In other cases discussed below,
the delegates went further and established new substantive principles. In their
press release of September 25, 1996, for example, they stated:
[N]oting paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the April 26 understanding, the Monitoring Group
called on all parties to desist in all circumstances from any shelling which is
disproportionate and indiscriminate, or directly or indirectly puts in danger the lives of
civilians and the safety of populated villages, and to adopt restraint and caution in
military operations in the vicinity of such areas.
132
In line with its mandate to issue a report which "will address and deal
with the situation and will contain recommendations for enhancing
compliance with the understanding,"'133 the Monitoring Group often included a
statement in its press releases suggesting how the parties might proactively
avoid civilian casualties in the future. Thus, for example, in its press statement
of July 17, 1997, the group declared, "The Monitoring Group warned of
cycles of action and reaction that could erode the Understanding. It called on
responsible authorities to exercise caution and restraint in order to defuse
tension and protect civilian lives on both sides of the border."'134 In another
statement, the delegates went beyond their common and generic
"reaffirmation of the provisions of the understanding of April 26, 1996," and
actually spelled out the exact duties of each party in their public
announcement.
135
In concluding their announcement, the delegates to the Monitoring
Group consistently thanked UNIFIL with a statement that the "Monitoring
Group expressed its great appreciation to UNIFIL for providing facilities and
support for the meeting.'
136
C. Establishing Principles and Jurisprudence
As one might expect would be the case with an international institution
meeting frequently over the course of four years in order to resolve disputes
and issue findings of fact, throughout its existence the Monitoring Group
established several noteworthy principles. These principles dealt with both the
procedural rules of its administration and with the substantive rules of the
conflict in south Lebanon. In considering the ILMG's jurisprudence, one
130. ILMG Statement 14, March 4, 1997.
131. See discussion infra Section VII.C.
132. ILMG Statement 4, Sept. 25, 1996.
133. ILMG Working Rules, art. 3.E, see infra Appendix A.
134. ILMG Statement 22, supra note 67.
135. They proclaimed:
In accordance with the language of the Understanding, Israel "will ensure... that
Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or
civilian targets in Lebanon" and "that under no circumstances will civilians be the
target of attack." Israel will take the necessary measures to ensure that Israeli forces
and those cooperating with them will comply fully with the Understanding.
ILMG Statement 25, supra note 69.
136. ILMG Statements passim.
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should keep in mind that relative to other international judicial or arbitral
institutions, the ILMG's four-year duration did not constitute a lengthy
lifetime. In many respects the group's jurisprudence was reflective of its
embryonic development, but its frequent meetings were enough to allow it to
achieve significant progress in several areas. An analysis of this progress
reveals much about the Monitoring Group's effectiveness in fulfilling member
states' needs as a micro-arena for nonviolent conflict and about the way in
which those states viewed the April Agreement.
In their first meeting, the delegates to the Monitoring Group agreed to
establish a principle of confidentiality. 137 In another early meeting, the
delegates recognized that "the Monitoring Group might deal with any issue of
common concern to reduce tensions.,, 138 A similar step towards the
establishment of a substantive body of administrative law was taken at the
ILMG meeting of July 16-17, 1997, when the delegates "agreed that all
articles of the April 26, 1996 Understanding are of equal weight."139 As one
might expect, the establishment of principles was a slow and lengthy process
and often did not involve an explicit statement of law.
In August of 1997, a year after the Monitoring Group had begun its
work, the delegates leaned towards the establishment of a rule governing the
accuracy of violation reports. They announced, "In order to enhance the
effectiveness of the Understanding, the Group also urged the appropriate
authorities to be precise and accurate in submission of violation reports in
compliance with the Understanding."'140 One year later, the delegates moved
towards the establishment of a principle requiring a minimum level of gravity
for the submission of complaints and a minimum standard of quality for the
presentation of evidence. 1 In addition to their demand for a minimum
standard of quality for submitted evidence, the delegates to the Monitoring
Group seem to have agreed on the establishment of a procedural rule requiring
the submission of evidence in order to meet burdens of proof in given
situations. It is not clear to the outsider when or how this rule was established.
In any event, the delegates made the existence of the rule and its consequential
results clear to the public by laying it down with a firm voice in their
statement of June 3, 1998. The delegates related that Lebanon had submitted a
complaint regarding the death of a Lebanese youth and the wounding of his
brother in an Israeli missile attack. The Lebanese delegation claimed that the
brothers were unarmed civilians and that no military activity was taking place
in the area at the time they were attacked. The Israeli delegation argued that
the brothers were assisting a Lebanese armed group and thus represented a
137. ILMG Statement 1, supra note 97; see also ILMG Statement 2, Aug. 15, 1996; ILMG
Statement 3, Sept. 1, 1996.
138. ILMG Statement 6, Nov. 6, 1996.
139. ILMG Statement 22, supra note 67.
140. ILMG Statement 24, supra note 117.
141. The ILMG delegates reported that "The Group also welcomed the statements by the
Lebanese and Israeli delegates indicating their desire to ensure that complaints of violation are
substantive and reasonable, with a view to strengthening the functioning of the Group and its
deliberations. Finally, the Monitoring Group stressed the necessity of maintaining high standards in the
presentation and evaluation of supporting evidence." ILMG Statement 48, June 10, 1998.
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legitimate target. In concluding its discussion of the issue, the Monitoring
Group declared, "Since the Israeli Delegate did not present supporting
evidence, the Monitoring Group concluded that this attack was a violation of
the Understanding."' 142 Participants in the Monitoring Group and students of it
could be certain from this point on that once a party had submitted a
reasonable complaint regarding the death of civilians, the accused party would
be found guilty of a violation if it did not present evidence in its defense.
Along with the above-mentioned procedural rules, the Monitoring Group
established substantive principles governing the conduct of the parties to the
conflict in southern Lebanon. Thus, for example, in its press release of
September 25, 1996 the Monitoring Group "called on all parties to desist in all
circumstances from any shelling which is disproportionate and indiscriminate,
or directly or indirectly puts in danger the lives of civilians and the safety of
populated villages, and to adopt restraint and caution in military operations in
the vicinity of such areas." 143 Such a principle, if it were in fact implemented
by the military forces in the region, would reduce the likelihood of violations
of the civilian immunity which lay at the center of the April Agreement. Just
over a month later, the group continued in its effort to adopt a set of rules
which would provide extra protection for the principles enshrined in the April
Agreement and ensure that the promise of safety for civilians would be
realized. The group announced that the delegates "agreed that all parties
should avoid activities of such nature which could constitute a violation of the
April 26 Understanding and that might inflict harm on civilians."
144
The Monitoring Group bolstered the protection given to civilians under
the April Agreement when it considered a Lebanese complaint in July of 1998
that Israeli forces had fired two missiles into a Lebanese village. The Israeli
delegate defended the action by explaining that the Israeli forces had fired the
missiles at two suspicious individuals in order to prevent a possible attack.
The Monitoring Group moved towards stronger protection for civilians by
establishing a default rule in similar cases. The group announced that it
"concluded that since the presumption of hostile intent does not justify
targeting a civilian populated area, the firing of these missiles was in violation
of the Understanding."'145 The delegates continued to establish principles that
would serve as barriers to the violation of the April Agreement when, for
example, they agreed on "the principle that the side launching an attack bears
responsibility for the consequences of its military actions. ' ' 46 In the case
which led to the public announcement of this strict liability principle, four
Lebanese women and two children had been injured when their mud-brick
house collapsed following an Israeli air strike on a military target several
hundred meters away. The delegates dealt with the case by deciding that while
"the location of the attacked target was at what would normally be considered
142. ILMG Statement 47, June 3, 1998.
143. ILMG Statement 4, supra note 132.
144. ILMG Statement 6, supra note 138.
145. ILMG Statement 53, supra note 125.
146. ILMG Statement 68, Jan. 14, 1999.
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a safe distance," the strict liability principle called for a conclusion that "the
injury to the civilians was an unintentional violation of the Understanding." 147
Several points should be made about these general principles. First,
these rules served as a kind of added protection for civilian immunity. If the
parties did apply these principles in their day-to-day actions in the field, they
would be much less likely to fire at or from civilian areas and to injure
civilians on either side of the border. By announcing their adoption and
acceptance of these principles in a public forum, the parties to the conflict
gave themselves an added incentive to adhere in actual practice to this body of
ILMG "common law." Moreover, by publicizing the establishment of these
rules, the Monitoring Group increased the predictability of the system. With
the introduction of each additional rule to the corpus of ILMG law, member
states and observers at large could be more certain of the outcome of the
deliberations in any given case. Knowing, for example, that the ILMG had
established a presumption that the attacking party bears responsibility for the
consequences of its actions, member states would be forewarned that they
faced greater chances of condemnation if one of their attacks led to civilian
casualties. With this awareness, parties would be less likely to undertake risky
attacks, and if they did so anyway, the predictable ILMG determination would
be more acceptable to the liable party.
It should be noted that these general principles were practical rules of
engagement, not abstract legal principles. For example, when the delegates
agreed that the parties should "desist in all circumstances from any shelling
which is disproportionate and indiscriminate," they were not invoking the
well-established law of war prohibiting disproportionate and indiscriminate
attacks. Rather, they were agreeing on a code of conduct that would serve as
an understandable and practical rule of behavior for military leaders and
commanders in the field. When the delegates to the Monitoring Group
convened a meeting, they did not cast their arguments in reference to outside
instruments and principles of international law. When the head of the
Lebanese delegation complained to the head of the Israeli delegation that
Israeli soldiers had used disproportionate and indiscriminate force, members
of both delegations, all of them high-ranking military officers, understood the
charge being made. The principles being developed by the ILMG were
understood as practical concepts with a real meaning grounded in the conflict
at hand, a meaning all of the players could understand without resort to legal
sophistry.
Once again, from the perspective of the New Haven scholar, the real-life
practicality of these principles does not make them any less legal. On the
contrary, the fact that they were mutually understood and mutually respected
as establishing critical protections for the core norms of the April Agreement
made them law in its truest sense. Although they were tested throughout the
Agreement's duration, these principles assumed the status of legal norms in
controlling the actions of the parties to the conflict.
147. Id.
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Moreover, one should note that while these principles could serve as a
protective network of law around the core of the April Agreement, the rules
set out in that document remained the sole body of law that the ILMG applied.
In other words, while an attack that resulted in civilian casualties would be
more likely to be found a violation if it had been disproportionate or
indiscriminate, an attack that was disproportionate or indiscriminate but did
not cause civilian casualties would not offer a proper cause of action and
would not constitute a violation of the Agreement. For the scholar of the New
Haven school this is an important insight. While certain incursions might lead
to repercussions on the battlefield, they would not amount to a violation of the
Agreement and would not lead to public condemnation by the ILMG. But
again, this "softness" was of limited importance when one considers that any
attack that was disproportionate or indiscriminate or in some other way a
violation of ILMG -"common law" was extremely likely also to violate the
April Agreement itself. 
148
D. Unprocessable Complaints
As the discussion above demonstrates, although the Monitoring Group
was able to achieve significant progress on many difficult issues, several
issues defied resolution because there was disagreement among the parties as
to whether the April Agreement and the ILMG mandate covered certain
actions. For example, when Lebanon submitted a complaint in September of
1996 concerning the expulsion of civilians, it took the Monitoring Group until
November to issue a public finding, and all it could manage at that time was a
statement that "[bly unanimity, the members of the Monitoring Group
accepted that there were differing views on whether this complaint fell within
the scope of the Understanding."' 49 Two-and-a-half years later, the group was
still unable to agree on whether expulsions fell within its mandate, and it was
again forced to issue a press release to this effect, stating that "the issue has
been raised in other channels and is being addressed by appropriate
authorities."'15 Likewise, in its final meeting the Monitoring Group was
unable to agree on whether the abduction of civilians fell within its
mandate.' s ' Similarly unprocessable complaints arose in regard to alleged
threats against the citizens of Amoun 152 and in regard to Israeli attempts to
fence off that village from areas outside the security zone, 153 as well as in
148. The above points apply as well to the principles that the Monitoring Group established in
regard to several frequently raised issues, such as the question of who is a "civilian" and what
constitutes a "civilian populated area." By laying out a clear jurisprudence on these issues, the ILMG
was able to improve the parties' adherence to the 1996 Agreement and enhance the value placed on
civilian immunity. Moreover, by announcing the adoption of each new principle, the ILMG signaled to
member states and observers how it would rule on future disputes, thereby increasing the transparency
and stability of the system.
149. ILMG Statement 6, supra note 138; see also ILMG Statement 34, Dec. 11, 1997
(reporting similar failure to coordinate on complaints of civilian expulsions).
150. ILMG Statement 75, Apr. 8, 1999.
151. ILMG Statement 103, Feb. 3,2000.
152. See ILMG Statement 20, June 24, 1997.
153. See ILMG Statement 71, Feb. 23, 1999; ILMG Statement 77, Apr. 19, 1999.
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regard to sonic booms set off by the Israeli Air Force in low overflights of
Beirut.
154
Just as an analysis of the ILMG's progress in dealing with certain issues
allows insight into the April Agreement and its monitoring mechanism, so too
does a consideration of the institution's paralysis in regard to other issues. The
Monitoring Group's inability to deal with some of the issues raised for
consideration demonstrates the limited and practical nature of the April
Agreement and its monitoring mechanism. The value of the regime rested in
its ability to reduce civilian casualties and dampen the likelihood of all-out
war, a function that could be satisfactorily fulfilled even if the Monitoring
Group was unable to resolve, for example, the issue of civilian expulsions.
Moreover, the convention may have benefited from the ambiguity these
disputes raised as to the scope of the April Agreement and the mandate of the
Monitoring Group. The point is somewhat counter-intuitive. One might
assume that civilians would have been unquestionably better off had it been
clear that the April Agreement banned expulsions of civilians and sonic
booming of towns and villages. However, it is not at all clear that the parties
would have acceded to an agreement comprehensive and explicit enough to
cover these and other potential scenarios, or that the parties would have
continued to abide by such a convention had they agreed to it. The limited
ambiguity of the April Agreement endowed the system it established with a
certain flexibility that may have been crucial to its endurance. This flexibility
allowed the parties to undertake and condemn actions of disputable validity.
Thus, for example, Israel could send fighter planes to set off sonic booms over
Beirut and still claim to be abiding by the Agreement, while Lebanon could
vigorously protest the action in the ILMG. In this way, the Monitoring
Group's paralysis in regard to certain issues allowed the parties to claim
faithfulness to the April Agreement while actively furthering their
constituencies' interests in Lebanon. This inherent flexibility did not
completely undermine the supreme value the Agreement supposedly placed
on civilian immunity because the system remained rigid enough to clearly
preclude (though not completely prevent) blatant attacks on civilian
populations. Throughout the convention's duration, the central tenets of the
Agreement, mutually understood and mutually accepted by all the parties to
the conflict, continued to guard civilian immunity as a protected norm.
Even in areas in which the Monitoring Group was able to achieve
significant progress, some ambiguity remained, with its consequent flexibility.
The parties were never able to agree, for example, on whether border-crossing
officials were protected civilians or legitimate military targets. Again, this
disagreement allowed the parties to pursue military objectives while
professing compliance with the April Agreement.
154. The ILMG statement dealing with this complaint simply stated that "the Group noted that
the matter had been handled in bilateral diplomatic channels." ILMG Statement 66, Dec. 20, 1998. But
a media report on the meeting suggested that the delegates had been unable to agree whether the action
fell within the bounds of the April Agreement. See Rudge, supra note 81. In a later case in which such
an IAF sonic boom resulted in a civilian injury, the Monitoring Group did find the action to be a
violation of the April Agreement. See ILMG Statement 85, supra note 69.
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Furthermore, one should note that the Monitoring Group mechanism
might have proven valuable even in cases in which the group was unable to
decide if it was authorized to hear the given complaint. In these cases, the
parties were still obligated to struggle with the issue of exactly what the
principles of the April Agreement dictated, and thereby to test and define the
norms they had created. In addition, the complaining state was still afforded a
public platform on which to announce that it considered the aggressor state in
breach of the April Agreement and thereby to vent its citizens' sense of
injustice without resort to increased military force. Finally, the submission of
these unprocessable complaints, just as much as the submission of processable
complaints, resulted in the convening of an ILMG meeting and an opportunity
for signaling and back-channel communications among the parties. Such
contacts could open the way for yet another back-channel of communication
or at least a one-time opportunity for signaling. In this way, the unprocessable
complaints may have served as well as the processable complaints to provide
the parties with opportunities to communicate and to avoid the possibility of a
mutually painful escalation of the conflict.
IX. THE SITUATION AFTER FEBRUARY 2000
In February of 2000, the fighting in southern Lebanon witnessed a
typical period of escalation. After Hesbollah attacks on Israeli positions in
south Lebanon had left six Israeli soldiers dead in two weeks, the Israeli Air
Force struck at power stations in Lebanon. While the Lebanese and Syrians
saw the Israeli strikes as a violation of the April Agreement, Israeli officials
insisted that the bombings were justified because deadly Hesbollah attacks
had been perpetrated from civilian areas.155 Commentators in Syria and
Lebanon speculated that under pressure from a public exhausted by rising
military casualties, Israel would demand that the April Agreement be
amended to prohibit all attacks on Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.
156
Israeli media sources did not report that the Israeli government intended to
amend the written text of the April Agreement, but they did note the change in
Israeli reactions to Hesbollah attacks. Whereas past attacks on Israeli soldiers
from civilian areas had drawn return fire to those civilian areas, and attacks on
Israeli civilians in northern Israel had sometimes drawn Israeli strikes on
Lebanese infrastructure, Israel had now changed the equation to attacks on
155. The legal logic presented by Israel might be strained, as the Law of Reprisals does not
seem to justify such a quid pro quo attack. See First Additional Protocol, supra note 36, art. 51(6).
Moreover, the Monitoring Group condemned similar Israeli strikes in June of 1999 and found that they
were a violation of the April Agreement. However, Israel publicly insisted that the reprisals of February
2000 were validated by a letter of understanding from the American Secretary of State in April 1996,
and Israel's right to self-defense. In an interview with the author, officers from the International Law
Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office declined to comment on this specific set of incidents,
maintaining that the issue of reprisals under the April Agreement and public international law is a
complex one and that because the ILMG had never determined whether the Israeli strikes were, in fact, a
violation of the Agreement, they would not comment on that issue. Interview with anonymous Major
and First Lieutenant of the IDF Judge Advocate General's Office (Aug. 10, 2000).
156. See, e.g., Syria and Israel Back to the Negotiating Table Next Week?, MIDEAST MIRROR,
Feb. 14,2000, on file with author (discussing articles in the Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat reporting Israeli
demands to amend the April Agreement).
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Lebanese infrastructure in return for attacks on Israeli soldiers from civilian
areas.
157
On February 11, 2000, in the midst of these public discussions of
changes in the rules of the game, the ILMG met to discuss complaints over the
heightened level of fighting. Just after the meeting had been convened, a
Hesbollah attack on an Israeli position left a seventh Israeli soldier dead in
two weeks. Israel believed that the attack was launched from a civilian area
and, viewing it as a blatant violation of the April Agreement and a clear sign
of ill will by the Syrian government, ordered its delegation to leave the
meeting and return home immediately. That meeting proved to be the ILMG's
final conference.
It remains unclear whether Israel formally left the group. The Israeli
government never issued a formal statement to that effect, and officers of the
Judge Advocate General's Office have denied to the author that Israel
withdrew from the institution. They argued that in light of the working rules'
call for Lebanon and Israel to "strive to create a stable and tranquil
environment for [the Monitoring Group] to carry out its work," Israel had
simply decided that the group should not meet under conditions of intense
fighting. Furthermore, the officers argued, by the time stability had been
restored, group meetings were no longer necessary since Israel had already
begun preparations for withdrawal that spring.158 However, sources in the
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs have told the author that the Israeli
government did make a conscious decision to withdraw from the group. They
report that actors in the Ministry of Defense persuaded the government that
participation in the Monitoring Group restricted the actions of the IDF too
severely. These same sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claim that the
motive behind the Ministry of Defense's move was not simply a desire to free
the hand of the military but also an underlying fear that participants in the
committee meetings had begun to build stronger ties with the Syrians and
Lebanese than officials in the Ministry of Defense had been able to
establish.15 9 Whether Israel made a formal policy decision to leave the group
or not, and whatever the motivations behind such a decision if it was in fact
made, the fact of the matter is that the committee has not reconvened since
February 11, 2000.
Mounting displeasure among the Israeli public and military due to
increasing IDF casualties, as well as the alleged political motivations on the
part of Ministry of Defense officials discussed in the previous paragraph, may
157. IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz was quoted as announcing, "For the first time, we struck
at infrastructure after a soldier was killed and not after Katyushas hit the Galilee." Nitzan Horowitz &
Amos Hare], South Lebanon Monitors to Meet as Fighting Eases, HA'AREiz (English Edition), Feb. 11,
2000, available at http://www.haaretzdaily.com.
158. Interview with anonymous Major and First Lieutenant of the IDF Judge Advocate
General's Office (Aug. 10, 2000).
159. For decades, Ui Lubrani, the Ministry of Defense's coordinator on Lebanon affairs, had
been looked to by Israeli governments as the Israeli official with the strongest connection to the Syrians
and Lebanese. However, anonymous diplomatic sources argue, with the success of the ILMG at building
back-channel connections between Israeli and Syrian and Lebanese delegates, Lubrani's status as the
best-informed Israeli official on Syrian and Lebanese affairs was threatened and he therefore sought to
take Israel out of the group.
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have played a role in the demise of the ILMG. However, like Israel's previous
withdrawal from the institution in the spring of 1999, the break in ILMG
meetings in the spring of 2000 was facilitated by the larger political context.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had pledged to pull Israeli troops out of
Lebanon within one year of his taking office in July of 1999. With the
withdrawal looming no more than five months into the future, Barak and the
Israeli government knew that there was less at stake than would ordinarily be
the case if the ILMG was dismantled at this point. Therefore, like the earlier
Israeli boycott of the ILMG in the spring of 1999, the Israeli decision to
abandon the group, or at least not to actively encourage meetings of the group,
may actually signify the strength, rather than the weakness, of the parties'
adherence to the April Agreement and their commitment to the Monitoring
Group. It was only under conditions in which the parties knew that such a
move would be relatively risk-free that they were willing to renounce the
April Agreement or not participate in the Monitoring Group.
The current status of the April Agreement and the ILMG remain unclear.
The Agreement and its mechanism appear to have become defunct since the
IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Nonetheless, the
convention continues to serve as a touchstone in the ongoing conflict between
Israel and Hesbollah. As late as March 6, 2000, American officials were still
calling for the group to reconvene, leading one to conclude that, as far as the
United States was concerned, the institution was still in existence and still
relevant at that point. 16 Furthermore, in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon in May 2000, State Department officials publicly aired the
possibility that the Monitoring Group could deal with disputes arising under
the new circumstances, once again pointing to the conclusion that in the
American view the April Agreement may still be in effect.
161
The April Agreement does not make explicit reference to the presence of
Israeli soldiers in south Lebanon. Thus, one might argue that it is technically
still binding upon both parties. However, a more practical viewpoint would
acknowledge that the Agreement has been superceded by events and is no
longer relevant in today's circumstances. As for the Agreement's enforcing
mechanism, its working rules also do not make mention of Israel's presence in
south Lebanon, but the Monitoring Group's existence clearly rests on the
April Agreement's validity. Nonetheless, with the Israeli-Lebanese border
witnessing continuing disorder, the two countries might find a reconstituted
convention and a resurrected Monitoring Group beneficial. In the final
analysis, this is the real question-will the two sides find it mutually
beneficial to coordinate on re-entering such an agreement? The issue of the
160. State Department Spokesman James Foley told the media, "At least in terms of the
Monitoring Group, I can confirm that our efforts and that of the other co-chair, France, continue with
capitals with the aim of reconvening the Monitoring Group, which is, in our view, the critical forum for
addressing tensions and reducing tensions in Southern Lebanon. I don't have an announcement to make
about the reconvening of the Group, but we and France remain hard at work in capitals to achieve that
purpose." U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Mar. 6, 2000, available at
http://www.state.gov/.
161. U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 24, 2000, available at
http'J/www.state.gov.
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technical legal status of the Agreement and the mechanism under today's
situation is academic. Since neither side can enforce the April Agreement in a
court of law, the real question is whether the political leaders on each side will
see the agreement as beneficial-a question which can only be answered in
the course of time. Even if the April Agreement is itself not renewed, its text
will undoubtedly serve as the key precedent for any future tacit or explicit
agreement, short of a full peace treaty, between Israel, Lebanon and Syria.
X. UNDERSTANDING THE APRIL AGREEMENT iN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The parties to the conflict in south Lebanon made a significant effort
over a period of four years to uphold the April Agreement and to protect the
lives of civilians. While application of the Agreement was by no means
perfect and civilians on both sides of the border continued to suffer, the
military forces did make an effort to abide by the Agreement and civilian
suffering was reduced. Moreover, throughout the period during which the
military forces in south Lebanon honored the text of the April Agreement,
other military forces in countless conflicts around the world did not make
even a semblance of an effort to protect civilians.
The war in southern Lebanon was not a likely candidate to be the one
international military conflict in which the parties agreed to restrict their
actions in accordance with a code of conduct that protects civilian targets. A
regular standing army employing weapons of mass firepower in order to hunt
and eliminate irregular forces operating in a populated field of action is not
likely to agree to restrict its forces to strictly military targets. Moreover, such
voluntary restraint is even less likely when the field of action is a natural
terrain that favors guerrilla warfare, as it is in south Lebanon. 162 Furthermore,
as far as Hesbollah is concerned, an irregular military force with the capacity
to wreak havoc on a soft metropolitan target by lobbing missiles at it is
unlikely to agree not to use such tactics.
Perhaps these fundamental characteristics of the war in south Lebanon
explain the overwhelming skepticism that greeted the announcement of the
April Agreement, or perhaps it was the parties' previous record of making and
then breaking understandings. 163 Whatever the cause of incredulity, one must
162. An expert on the war in Lebanon and guerrilla warfare has written,
The area is considered to be highly useful for guerrilla warfare, and [Hesbollah]
teams, familiar with its routes and obstacles, are quick to exploit its advantages.
Military convoys and vehicles are incapable of moving through the basalt ravines.
They are limited to certain roads and narrow winding tracks and are under constant
threat from guerrilla ambushes.
SHMUEL GORDON, THE VULTURE AND THE SNAKE: COUNTER-GUERRiLLA AIR WARFARE: THE WAR IN
SouTHERN LEBANON 8-9 (1998).
163. Even participants in the system themselves viewed the April Agreement and the
Monitoring Group with skepticism. For example, in 1998, the head of the French delegation and former
Chair of the ILMG, Laurent Rapin, told a reporter that in the first year after the Group's establishment
"every meeting was thought to be our last, and every additional meeting was thus thought a victory." Ad
She'Yotzeh Ashan Lavan, [Until a White Smoke Comes Out], Ici LA FRANCE, July-Aug. 1998, at 10.
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ask why the parties managed to converge on the Agreement in 1996 and why
they remained faithful to it for nearly four years.
In considering this issue, one should distinguish between the United
States, France, Lebanon and Hesbollah on the one hand, and Syria and Israel
on the other. For not only are the latter two states the parties upon whom the
responsibilities for living up to the April Agreement ultimately fell, but they
are also the parties whose adherence to the Agreement most demands
explanation. American and French support for the Agreement and the
activities of the Monitoring Group might be more readily understood, as these
states benefited from the relative stability that the system lent the volatile
region. Furthermore, both states stood to garner benefits in terms of
international influence and prestige in mediating the conflict in south
Lebanon.
To the extent that the actions of the Lebanese government require
elucidation beyond the recognition that those actions are generally dictated by
Syria, one might posit that Lebanon was driven by a sincere concern for the
well-being of its own citizens and a desire to protect its civil infrastructure. To
the extent that Syria would allow Hesbollah to determine its own course of
action, Hesbollah had an incentive to obey the Agreement, which placed it in
a position of power. Although the ILMG never mentioned IHesbollah by name
in its press releases, it was clear to all of the member states that the system
established by the April Agreement revolved around Hesbollah's
acquiescence to its code of conduct.
While the interests of the United States, France, Lebanon and Hesbollah
are understandable, the cooperation of Syria and Israel is quite puzzling. In
trying to understand this enigma, a viewpoint grounded in international law is
most useful. In his influential study of strategy, Thomas Schelling has shown
that parties to a conflict can agree on limited war through tacit or explicit
bargaining if they share "common interests."164 In this case Israel and Syria
certainly did share common interests-the avoidance of a full scale Israeli-
Syrian war. Engaged in a deeply entrenched military and political struggle,
which could easily escalate into an extremely costly all-out war, both states
had incentives to craft a system that would enable them to avoid such a
possibility. Furthermore, Israel desperately sought protection for its civilians
from Katyusha rocket attacks while Syria sought to continue to use the
violence in Lebanon as leverage for the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian
control. With American and French assistance, Israel and Syria were able to
dampen the prospects of war and satisfy their respective needs by creatively
turning to a legal convention.
This analysis is especially persuasive in light of the broader historical
context of the April Agreement. Syria and Israel had already fought major
164. THoMAs SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (2d ed. 1960). Schelling conducted his
work at the height of the Cold War, amidst fears of nuclear conflict between the superpowers. Some
readers might question whether lessons from such an exceptional case are applicable to the Israeli-
Syrian relationship. In fact, fears of an extremely destructive war involving chemical and biological
weapons have produced somewhat similar dynamics in the Israeli-Syrian relationship. While the Cold
War is surely exceptional in some ways, as the discussion below illustrates, Schelling's work may be
applied quite effectively to the Israeli-Syrian case.
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inter-state wars against each other in 1948, 1967, and 1973, and the two states
confronted each other in the 1982 Lebanon War as well. Not only could the
bitter rivalry easily explode into a hot war on the Israeli-Syrian border, but it
could also lead to a full-fledged Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon. Moreover, the
ongoing violence in southern Lebanon made the threat of all-out war a
palpable one throughout the duration of the Agreement's existence. The
shared desire to avoid the fulfillment of this threat led the parties to converge
on the unique legal convention at the center of this study.
Indeed, the historical context of this case is not only one of repeated
war; it is also one of repeated efforts at avoiding war. From the 1960s
onwards, Israel and Syria have engaged in a deterrence dialogue in the
Lebanese arena aimed at constructing a system to contain their rivalry. The
two states have sent explicit messages through Washington and the public
media, and tacitly signaled one another with maneuvers in the field, all in an
effort to avoid war-an effort which failed in 1973 and 1982. In this respect,
the April Agreement may be seen as an offspring of the red-lines agreements:
a unique and improved system, but one which was built upon the model of
these earlier war-avoidance efforts.
Seen in this historical context, one can more easily understand Israel's
and Syria's continuous adherence to the April Agreement as a manifestation
of a shared interest in avoiding war. Had either state been more confident of
its ability to achieve gains in a full-scale war, Israel and Syria probably would
not have agreed to limit the struggle. Likewise, had the parties been willing or
able to disentangle themselves from their longstanding military conflict, they
would not have found the need to create a system of containment in Lebanon.
However, facing an intractable dynamic of struggle which threatened to spiral
into a costly war, the two states shared a common interest in building and
adhering to this mechanism.
A. The Equilibrium Convergence Point: Civilian Immunity and the Laws of
War
In considering how Israel's and Syria's common interests led them to
reach the April Agreement and led them to uphold it in the ensuing years, one
should consider exactly what conditions the countries agreed upon-
principally civilian immunity.165 Schelling argues that variables such as
simplicity, precedent, and natural boundaries will play a powerful role in
signaling to the parties at which exact point their negotiations may reach
equilibrium. As Schelling would predict especially for an international
165. One should consider, as well, to what conditions they did not agree. Schelling describes a
"strong attraction to the status quo ante." Id. at 68. Perhaps the attraction to the status quo ante explains
Syria's and Lebanon's reluctance in 1996 to agree on the original Israeli cease-fire proposal. The
Syrians and Lebanese might also, for example, have proposed that Israel agree to a prohibition on the
use of phosphorous weapons. The fact that apparently neither party raised this issue may reflect the
perception that it would not have been a viable outcome since it would have represented a move away
from the status quo ante. Likewise, the attractiveness of the status quo ante may explain the parties'
refusal to expand the April Agreement to include further restrictions which have been proposed, such as
a ban on the use of roadside bombs.
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agreement between two states (Israel and Lebanon), made with a third party
mediator (the United States), in consultation with yet another third party
(Syria), governing an extremely complex situation, the April Agreement is a
blunt and simple document. Moreover, as Schelling posits is likely to be the
case, the Agreement is clearly shaped by its 1993 predecessor. 166 As Schelling
notes, "The outcome may not be so much conspicuously fair or conspicuously
in balance with estimated bargaining powers as just plain 'conspicuous."" 167
Furthermore, while simplicity, precedent, and the acceptability of the
status quo may have made civilian immunity the obvious convergence point,
the fact that the principle has been enshrined as the most fundamental rule of
the laws of war may have made it even more conspicuous. The principle was
"prominent" not only because observers thought it was fair or just but
because, since both sides knew it was viewed as such, they may have believed
that agreeing to it would not signal to their adversary or other observers that
they were vulnerable to being forced into further concessions.
Further scrutiny of the fact that civilian immunity was the conspicuous
outcome in this case confirms the supposition that Israel and Syria were
driven by a common interest in avoiding all-out war. Perhaps both Israel and
Syria shared a sincere concern for the well-being of civilians: such benevolent
concerns would help explain why their bargaining resulted in coordination on
civilian protection. But two other possible explanations for their convergence
on civilian protection as the overarching principle of the Agreement
strengthen the hypothesis that the underlying interest was avoiding an all-out
Israeli-Syrian war.
First, as the respective leaders must have known, domestic political
pressure can often be a major factor in the precipitation of war. Indeed, it was
the unrest caused by the wave of suicide bombings and the mounting toll of
military casualties in Lebanon that pushed Peres to launch Operation Grapes
of Wrath. By reducing civilian suffering in southern Lebanon and northern
Israel, Israel and Syria could diminish the prospects that strong domestic
pressure would push the two states to war. Realizing that civilian casualties on
either side could precipitate such escalation, the states recognized a common
interest in protecting civilians through adherence to the April Agreement.
Second, the high population density of southern. Lebanon makes it a
theater in which the exertion of any considerable military force could easily
result in civilian casualties. Therefore, by pledging to protect civilians from
the fighting in Lebanon, Israel and Syria were implicitly limiting the amount
of military force employed in the arena. In this respect, the April Agreement
mirrored the red-lines system that limited the types of weapons which could
be deployed in Lebanon. While the Agreement did not place any explicit limit
on the arsenals permitted in Lebanon, the very fact that it placed civilians in a
protected sphere put major exertions of force off-limits. Furthermore, by
constraining the scope of force that the parties could exercise in Lebanon, the
166. Id. at 67 ("Precedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds its logical
importance or legal force.").
167. Id. at 69.
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Agreement reduced the chances that the Israeli-Syrian rivalry in that arena
would spiral into an Israeli-Syrian war.
B. The Role of the ILMG in Preserving the 1996 System
Israel and Syria maintained the code of conduct established by the April
Agreement because it served to contain the level of conflict between them.
They may have remained faithful to the April Agreement, however, for a
longer period of time because it was superior to the various red-lines systems
and the July 1993 understanding. First, because the parties agreed to a written
set of rules, the 1996 convention may have been more stable. While several of
the earlier understandings were similarly explicit, the presence of a written
text protected this system. This is not to deny that the enhanced flexibility of
tacitly agreed-upon conventions is advantageous in many ways, but in this
case the transcription of at least some of the rules of the system seems to have
protected it from unraveling. 168 Furthermore, the prohibition on targeting
civilians, a prohibition not incorporated into the red-lines systems, may have
added to the Agreement's durability. As argued above, the reduction of
civilian suffering could be expected to limit otherwise dangerous domestic
pressure for war and restrain the deployment of military force in the field.
Moreover, the fact that the parties coordinated on an equilibrium point that
stands as the central principle of the laws of war-civilian immunity-lent the
system crucial stability. Most significantly, the system established by the
April Agreement distinguished itself from its predecessors through the
creation of the ILMG, which played an important role in enforcing the regime.
The frequent meetings of the group seem to have lent the Agreement
greater currency and to have increased its level of implementation. While the
group was not armed with any sanction power beyond public reprimand, its
ability to issue public statements condemning the actions of one party or
another did serve as a considerable enforcement mechanism. In this vein, the
group served the April Agreement as Walter Lippmann's plate glass window
protected the jewelry store: any party could break it easily enough, but not
without creating an uproar. 169 Because the work of the Monitoring Group
endowed the Agreement with a heightened level of application, Israel and
Syria faced greater incentives to continue to adhere to the Agreement.
Furthermore, the Monitoring Group may have significantly increased the
stablity of the April 1996 system by providing the parties with a nonviolent
outlet for contention. Faced with internal rancor over casualties suffered in the
conflict, 170 Israel and Syria could respond to one another and satisfy their
respective constituencies through non-violent means. Consider the following
extract from the ILMG's statement of October 18, 1996:
168. One should note that this convention did retain some flexibility despite the transcription
of the rules. The parties could continue to negotiate over ambiguous issues, such as whether the sonic
booming of Israeli jets over Beirut constitutes a violation of the Agreement. Furthermore, they could
continue to bargain over understandings which remained tacit rules of the system.
169. See SCHELLiNG, supra note 164, at 38, citing Walter Lippman's analogy.
170. Reisman has considered the implications of rising military casualties for a democratic
entity fighting an optional war. See Reisman, supra note 14.
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The Lebanese and Syrian representatives expressed the view that the shelling was
deliberate and voiced the concern that the Israeli artillery action was aimed at raising
tension to prepare the ground for a wider Israeli military action. The Israeli representative
assured that this was not the case and that Israel's policy was exactly opposite.
The Israeli representative stated that Israel considered this counterfire defensive, while
the Lebanese and Syrian representatives rejected such an interpretation. 17 1
Because the governments of Israel, Lebanon and Syria could all return to
their constituencies with this statement and continue to present
themselves as protecting their interests in the conflict while
simultaneously upholding the April Agreement, they could all afford to
remain party to the mechanism. In this regard, the Agreement served as
legal pageantry to some extent. But this symbolic function also played
an important role in controlling events in the field. Israeli representative
to the ILMG Brigadier General David Tzur has posited:
The Monitoring Group's effectiveness lies in its role as a tension-curbing mechanism. In
a number of instances, had the specific problem arisen before Operation Grapes of Wrath,
it would have provoked an escalation .... Thanks to the understandings achieved after
Operation Grapes of Wrath, problems are discussed by the ILMG, which ... makes its
decision, and that's all there is to it
17 2
Attacks on one side or the other no longer necessarily led to escalation
because, with the Monitoring Group in place, the injured party could appease
its citizens through the meetings in Naqura instead of military actions in the
field. In an action that nicely illustrates the added value provided by the ILMG
as a forum for venting, the IDF itself has even gone so far as to list the
complaints filed by the Israeli government on its web site.17 The Monitoring
Group itself recognized this important function when, for example, it "agreed
that any potential violation of the Understanding should be brought to the
attention of the Monitoring Group in order that it not lead to a cycle of
violence."1 74 In this sense, the ILMG offered the parties a micro-arena in
which to voice complaints over the adversary's behavior and thereby to vent
otherwise destructive internal pressures.
The creation of the ILMG was also an extremely significant
development in the effort to contain Israeli-Syrian conflict because it opened a
new channel of direct communication between the parties. Under the previous
systems the parties were forced to signal one another through public
statements or actions, or at best, to send explicit messages through third
parties. 175 In contrast, under the system established in 1996, the parties could
communicate directly, in a confidential and protected setting, without the
171. ILMG Statement 5, supra note 29.
172. IDF Radio (Israel), General on ILMG Role, Meetings with "Senior" Syrian Officer, June
6, 1997, FBIS-NES-97-156, available at http.//wne.fedworld.gov.
173. Israel Defense Forces, Violations of The Grapes of Wrath Understandings, available at
http://www.idf.il/english/statistics/violations.stm (last visited March 11, 2002).
174. ILMG Statement 25, supra note 171.
175. EvRoN, supra note 10, at 214 ('[W]hen a detailed and specific system of deterrence
thresholds is required, tacit bargaining is not sufficient, a trusted mediator becomes vital, and explicit
signals and communications become necessary.").
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problems of third-party translation.176 In this respect, the April Agreement was
crafted in the mold of a much older system than the previous Israeli-Syrian
understandings discussed above: the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice
Agreement. 177 That document, which called for a complete cessation of
hostilities, also established a Mixed Armistice Commission to oversee the
armistice and resolve disputes concerning application of the Armistice
Agreement. The Commission was to maintain two headquarters, including one
at Naqura, and, like the ILMG, it was to be composed of five members and to
make decisions unanimously.
178
The latent communication function of the ILMG significantly enhances
the value of the April Agreement. Israel and Syria could use their newly-
opened channel to establish arrangements on particular issues such as prisoner
exchanges,1 79 to ensure that specific incidents of violence did not spiral into
war, and to carry on more general forms of explicit or tacit communication.
Meetings of the Monitoring Group repeatedly allowed the parties to the
conflict to rein in the violence when it might otherwise have spiraled out of
control.'8 0 After a particularly tense flare up in August of 1997, the Chair of
the Monitoring Group, Laurent Rapin, explained to the media that the group
had helped keep the conflict under control. 18 An Israeli delegate to the group
has also said that during his year-long tenure the group more than once was
able to halt what would otherwise have been a "deterioration of the situation,"
including one cycle of violence which he said would almost certainly have led
to a Katyusha attack on Israel had the representatives not met.' In a similar
176. Evron has commented on these problems in the Israeli-Syrian context:
Washington's mediation was attended by ambiguities. The relationship between
Washington and Damascus was hardly intimate. Mutual suspicions might have
created misperceptions. Even the Israeli-American relationship, though close, was
complicated and allowed scope for suspicion. Indeed, it is not yet clear to what extent
Washington manipulated the messages delivered to it by both Israel and Syria. Israeli
and Syrian messages may have been "doctored" by Washington in the interest of
easing both sides into an indirect understanding.
Id.
177. For the text of the Armistice Agreement, see Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice
Agreement, March 23, 1949, Isr.-Leb., reprinted in 1 THE ARAB-ISRAEL COLLECTION, supra note 8, at
102.
178. One should note that the never-implemented Israeli-Lebanese Agreement of 1983 also
contained a provision for the creation of a Joint-Liaison Committee, which would make decisions
unanimously and include American participation. For the text of that agreement, see Agreement
Between Israel and Lebanon, May 17, 1983, art. 7, Isr.-Leb., 1 THE ARAB-ISRAEL COLLECTION: ANNUAL
REPORTS, supra note 8, at 308-11.
179. The Monitoring Group appears to have facilitated at least one prisoner exchange between
Lebanon and Israel. Beirut Radio Lebanon, Israel To Release 22 Lebanese Prisoners From al-Khiyam,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Jan. 3, 2000 (translating Arabic radio broadcast).
180. In 1997, Brigadier General David Tzur, the head of the Israeli delegation to the ILMG,
remarked, "Back then [April 1996], the optimists said we wouldn't last eight months . . . But the
Monitoring Group has done what it was meant to do and proves itself with every new incident which has
the potential of causing a deterioration in the area." O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 8.
181. Rapin related, "[W]e were able to get out of this difficult situation. I think that the
conversations that were conducted by phone, at the time the committee was meeting in Nakoura, by the
ministers of the five countries helped a lot .... During the August crisis, the delegations, and especially
the Syrian delegation, played a very responsible role in quieting the tension and reestablishing, during
the meetings that followed, the minimum amount of trust between the delegations." David Rudge & Jay
Bushinsky, France: Lebanon Deal Must Include Syria, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at 1.
182. As Dr. Gerald Steinberg, a specialist on Middle East strategy told a reporter, "Nlone of
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vein, in its statement of December 9, 1998, the Monitoring Group itself paid
homage to its ability to keep particularly explosive episodes of violence under
control by announcing, "The Monitoring Group also acknowledged that
positive steps have helped lead to a situation in which incidents that could
impact civilians and their property have been minimized in spite of ongoing
military activity in recent days." 18
Prior to the signing of the April Agreement and the institution of the
Monitoring Group, the tit-for-tat policies of the opposing forces resulted in a
dynamic of escalation that could easily spin out of control, as it did in the days
leading up to the Israeli offensives of 1993 and 1996. However, with the
Monitoring Group in place, the parties could directly communicate and
reassure one another of their shared interest in avoiding war. If one takes the
view that Israel and Syria's underlying aim in creating and adhering to the
April Agreement was the avoidance of an Israeli-Syrian war, then this
communication function assumes added significance as part of a system of
control. In this way, the ILMG served not only as an enforcement mechanism
for the April Agreement, but also as an insurance mechanism for that
convention and the general peace and stability of the region it sought to
promote. In cases in which the April Agreement was breached and the
violence threatened to spiral out of control, the convening of an ILMG
meeting could act as a safety net protecting the parties from greater violence.
Israel and Syria were able to use the channel not only to keep specific
episodes of escalation under control, but also to send more general messages
about the conflict in Lebanon. For example, in one such publicly announced
communication in 1998, Israel delivered a warning to its adversaries about
continued Hesbollah violations of the April Agreement. 184 Even more
importantly, ILMG meetings served as a latent communication channel,
allowing Israel and Syria to send tacit or explicit messages about their general
relationship. While some delegates to the meetings have admitted that their
interactions did carry such meaning,18 5 others have insisted that their
conversations were restricted to the issues raised by Israeli and Lebanese
complaints and thus could not have served a back-channel communication
function.18 6 However, the Monitoring Group has publicly announced that its
the parties want this last forum to disintegrate. They don't want it to fail. It is the only place where there
is Israeli-Syrian contact." O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 8.
183. ILMG Statement 65, Dec. 8, 1998.
184. Israel has issued a warning to Lebanon over continued violations of the Grapes of Wrath
understandings by Hizbullah gunmen firing from inside the security zone and from the outskirts
of villages north of the zone. The warning was given during a meeting at UNIFIL's headquarters
in Nakoura of the five-nation monitoring group which concluded discussions early yesterday on
a single complaint from Israel.
David Rudge, In Response to Hizbullah Fire from Villages. Israel Issues Warning to Lebanon,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 10, 1998, at 5.
185. Two Israeli delegates have told the author that the meetings did serve an important role as
a back-channel of communication between Israel, Syria and Lebanon.
186. A Lebanese delegate with whom the author has spoken is skeptical of the back-channel
role of the Monitoring Group. He argues that the meetings could never serve as an effective back-
channel because the delegates were strictly limited in what they were permitted to discuss and did not
deal with any matters other than the specific complaints of Israel and Lebanon. Likewise, a report in the
Beirut daily al-Safir quotes Lebanese diplomatic sources insisting that ILMG meetings could not serve
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mandate was not so restricted, reporting in November of 1996 that the
delegates had recognized that the group "might deal with any issue of
common concern to reduce tensions." 187 In fact, the group has reportedly
worked on an assortment of issues not covered by its mandate, including a
prisoner exchange, a resolution of the fate of boat people stranded off the
Lebanese coast, and a three day ceasefire to recover the bodies of fallen
soldiers.18 8 But even if the delegates did refrain from discussing issues outside
of those raised by the complaints submitted to the group, their interactions
nonetheless could have served as a forum for signaling.
One can speculate, therefore, that Israel and Syria did use this channel of
communication to feel one another out and to signal one another in a broader
context. Such back-channel communications would have been especially
important in the Israeli-Syrian relationship since the two states are unable to
communicate openly through other channels and did not participate in
bilateral peace talks throughout nearly all of the Agreement's duration.
In this vein of facilitation of interactions, one should also note the
potential for individual relationship-building. The individual delegates were
influential military and diplomatic actors in their own countries, and any
feelings of goodwill and personal relationships which they may have formed
through the meetings could well have affected their respective countries'
stances towards each other.189 One delegate has, in fact, told the author that he
was asked by the foreign policy establishment in his country whether his state
could trust the other side in case of a peace deal, and that based on his
dealings with his counterparts in Naqura he reported that leaders of the state
could in fact be trusted to hold to their word.1  Furthermore, a former Chair
of the Monitoring Group has reported that he made a point of walking Israeli
and Syrian officials into private rooms in the UNIFIL compound and then
slipping away, leaving them to talk in complete privacy.191 Viewing the April
Agreement as a containment mechanism created out of a shared interest in
as a back channel of communication between Israel and Syria or Israel and Lebanon "because neither
the Lebanese nor the Syrian delegations talk directly to the Israelis around the round table. They address
their talk directly to ILMG Ambassador Greenlee. Besides, the discussions do not involve issues that are
not within the ILMG's jurisdiction but are restricted to the discussion of the complaint." Al-Safir
(Beirut), A Diplomatic Assessment of the Monitoring Group's Work. Discussions in Limbo, Nov. 6,
1996, FBIS-NES-96-2-17, available at http://wnc.fedworld.gov.
187. ILMG Statement 6, supra note 138.
188. For a report of the prisoner exchange, see Beirut Radio Lebanon, supra note 179. The
ILMG's involvement in the situation of the boat people and the establishment of a cease-fire were
related to the author by a former Chair of the Monitoring Group. Interview with anonymous Chair of the
ILMG (Nov. 24,2000).
189. Israeli delegates said that although meetings were often filled with tension, there were
moments of breakthrough when delegates were able to communicate with one another on more amicable
terms. One delegate claimed that personal relations within this insulated institution grew so strong that at
the end of the final meeting in which he participated there were tears in his counterparts' eyes. However,
a Lebanese diplomat who participated in the meetings denies that any amicable personal relationships
were ever formed, calling any such reports "illusions."
190. This same delegate informed the author that the back channel function of the group was
so important that at times the complaints themselves were secondary and that the states sought
complaints simply as an excuse to meet.
191. See Interview with anonymous Chair of the ILMG (Nov. 24, 2000).
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avoiding war, one can fully appreciate the extraordinary value of the
communication brought to the system by the meetings of the ILMG.
XI. CONCLUSION
To the untrained eye, the April 1996 Agreement looks like a bizarre and
nonsensical arrangement between Israel and Lebanon. However, one can
begin to make sense of the Agreement by viewing it through the lens of the
international legal scholar. Faced with an intractable rivalry which threatened
to lead to a war they both perceived as undesirable, Israel and Syria shared a
common interest over four years in constructing and maintaining a system of
containment for their conflict. That system was first and foremost a legal one,
regulating the behavior of the parties and their proxies in southern Lebanon,
the locus of their most combative interactions. In coordinating on the April
Agreement, Israel and Syria were able to safeguard common interests by
agreeing to limit the actions of their forces and those of their proxies. In
addition, the states created a juridical body to resolve disputes concerning
perceived violations of the legal regime. Conveniently, the meetings of this
body, the ILMG, also served to further the goals of the legal regime by
augmenting its application and by allowing the parties to deflect internal
pressure and to communicate with each other.
Having used concepts endemic to the study of international law in order
to explicate the April Agreement, perhaps one can conversely use this case
study in the creation and maintenance of an international legal institution to
shed light on the legislative process in international law in general. In this
case, two states facing a seemingly insoluble dilemma turned to international
law to remedy their situation as best as they could. The turn to law in this case
did not follow the pattern familiar to the scholar of domestic legal institutions.
Compare, for example, the actions of Israel and Syria in this case, with those
of the state actor trying to increase public order in the domestic realm.
In the domestic universe, a national legislative institution might pass
new legislation in order to deal with a particular problem facing its
constituents. The legislators may have to search for the most effective law to
deal with the targeted problem, and the proponents of a law may have to
bargain for passage of the statute, but the process is familiar and the template
pre-existing. In the international universe, on the other hand, while Israel and
Syria did, by 1996, have a primitive model on which to construct their
convention in the series of previous failed systems as well as the 1949 Israeli-
Lebanese Armistice Agreement, the task was much more complex. The states
could not turn to an established legislative institution in which to
expeditiously formulate a new legal arrangement. On the contrary, they were
forced to seek assistance from at least one outside authority in order to cobble
together a novel legal regime that would regulate the actions of a wide range
of state and non-state actors.
Furthermore, the international realm, as represented by the case at hand,
differs from the domestic one in regards to the enforcement of legal norms.
Skeptics of international law might say that the April Agreement held in place
because it was not in fact law, but a meaningless statement. The parties were
2002]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
not bound by it in the sense that one is bound by the domestic laws of one's
country, and they were free to renounce it at any time. Indeed, all parties to
the conflict appear to have violated the Agreement numerous times from its
inception. However, the fact that the Agreement did not see 100 percent
application does not mean that it was not law. On the contrary, as this Article
has shown, the Agreement played an extremely important role in shaping the
behavior of all the parties to the Lebanon conflict. Indeed, it assumed a kind
of omnipresence, coloring every interaction in the conflict for four years.
The Agreement was undoubtedly soft in some sense. But as scholars of
international law have argued, soft law is still law. 192 The Agreement's
softness, to the extent that it was soft, may in fact have been a crucial reason
why the parties were able to agree on it and were willing to remain bound by
it. In a hypothetical world in which a hard law agreement with a strong
enforcement mechanism had been proposed to the parties in 1996, one doubts
whether the Israeli and Syrian governments would have accepted it. But the
Agreement's softness was limited. Underlying the soft facade was a hard core
of enforcement backed up by the Israeli and Syrian military forces. Herein lay
the April Agreement's otherwise inexplicable endurance. Simply put, both
Israel and Syria had incentives to uphold the April Agreement as a beneficial
code of conduct as they continued their struggle in Lebanon. While they
demonstrated a willingness to continue fighting, neither country wanted the
conflict to spiral into a full-scale Israeli-Syrian war, a war that would be
extremely costly for both sides. Hence the parties saw fit to agree on a set of
rules that enabled them to continue their conflict, but within limits acceptable
to both. Thus the case at hand may be reflective of the larger lesson that even
without the type of enforcement mechanism available in the domestic realm,
states may be able to remain faithful to a legal norm if they mutually perceive
non-compliance to be more costly than compliance.
The fact that the parties remained faithful to the April Agreement for
four years does not mean that the legal institution was costless. On the
contrary, in addition to the obvious administrative costs of participation in the
Monitoring Group, the states faced various other political and strategic costs
in adhering to the regulations. For example, state leaders on both sides were
forced to restrict the behavior of their military forces. Such limitations not
only circumscribed the set of options open to their military agents but also
brought a political cost in the form of public constituencies dissatisfied with
this restraint. Yet despite the inherent costs of the system, both Israel and
Syria appraised it as the most cost effective option available. The alternatives,
various levels of risk of war, were perceived as even more costly. Herein lies
one of the critical lessons of the April Agreement: because they viewed the
alternative policy options as more costly, Israel and Syria created and
maintained a legal regime regulating their behavior despite its inherent costs
and despite the fact they were embroiled in a hot military conflict with one
another.
192. See Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics,
in 1 ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS 135 (Emmanuel G. Bello & Prince Bola A.
Ajibola, eds. 1992).
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The April 1996 Agreement and the ILMG are certainly unique. But
despite its exceptional character, the case at hand may illustrate a broader
point about parties to conflict in general. While states may not be likely to
craft explicit, written legal regimes regulating military conflicts and to
establish monitoring mechanisms to enforce these agreements, the
phenomenon of two adversaries sharing mutual interests during a time of war
may not be so rare. Indeed, unless they are willing to engage in a no-holds-
barred fight to the death, states are likely to share a converging interest in the
containment of military conflicts within certain limits. 193 While states may not
always recognize these common interests or may not be able to coordinate
their actions for mutual gain, it is likely that they often will achieve some
arrangement, however tacit and however incomplete, to protect shared
interests to the extent they can. This explains the innumerable limited conflicts
that rage around the world at any given moment.
While coordination on mutually advantageous behavior by warring
states may be a common aspect of conflict, the scholar should go further than
the recognition of the phenomenon and ask whether it serves a greater value
or whether it may be destructive in its net aggregate effects. In this case, for
example, one is led to ask whether the Agreement between Israel and Lebanon
may have been pathological. By prohibiting strikes on civilian targets and the
use of civilian areas as launching grounds for attack, the April Agreement left
itself open to exploitation by parties wishing to undermine its object and its
existence. If Hesbollah or parties controlling it determined that it was in their
best interests to destroy the April Agreement, they could do so by firing on
Israeli forces from the fringes of populated areas in the hope of drawing
damaging counter-fire. Such a scenario, which Israeli officials did actually
claim to be reality in February of 2000, could easily escalate the violence to a
level that rendered the April Agreement functionally irrelevant.
Even if the April Agreement was not inherently pathological, one might
raise an opposite concer-that it allowed a low intensity conflict to smolder
and exact continuing damages. If the alternative was a short-term war with a
more decisive outcome, one might argue that the April Agreement was
actually destructive. 194 Had they not been assured that they could keep their
193. Schelling puts the point this way:
Pure conflict, in which the interests of two antagonists are completely opposed, is a
special case; it would arise in a war of complete extermination, otherwise not even in
war. For this reason, "winning" in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive
meaning; it is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means gaining relative to
one's own value system; and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual
accommodation, and by the avoidance of mutually damaging behavior. If war to the
finish has become inevitable, there is nothing left but pure conflict; but if there is any
possibility of avoiding a mutually damaging war, of conducting warfare in a way that
minimizes damage, or of coercing an adversary by threatening war rather than waging
it, the possibility of mutual accommodation is as important and dramatic as the
element of conflict.
SCHELLING, supra note 164, at 4-5.
194. For an example of this type of argument, see Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 36 (July-Aug. 1999). Luttwak's argument is addressed to those considering foreign
intervention. But in the case at hand, Israel and Syria may have found a way to keep their conflict under
control even without American and French intervention at the end of Operation Grapes of Wrath.
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conflict within bearable limits, Israel and Syria may have chosen to stifle the
violence completely. One would be hard-pressed to make accurate
calculations about the relative costs of the possible scenarios, however, and in
this case Israel and Syria apparently both came to the conclusion that the
Agreement was not in fact destructive.
The system might also have been deeply flawed to the extent that it
undermined public faith in law among the region's population. If two states
announce the achievement of a new legal regime and then continually violate
the enshrined norm while claiming to honor it, constituents may begin to
reevaluate the meaning of law. In this case, the repeated testing of the norm
may have helped define and strengthen it. Indeed, a norm needs to be tested at
least to a minimal extent before it can truly be considered a norm. But the
long-term aggregate impact of such behavior on the people whom it affects
most is not at all clear.
While the value of the system may be questionable, the crucial point for
the present discussion is that in the case at hand, despite the possible existence
of deep underlying flaws, for four years Israel and Syria found the legal
arrangement useful in advancing their shared interests. Because the
arrangement in this case - an explicit understanding to fight a limited war - is
quite novel, one should be cautious about extrapolating conclusions about
converging interests in military conflicts in general. Indeed, it remains a
question whether this type of agreement is exportable. The conflict in south
Lebanon is a unique situation, and the mechanism employed there may not be
possible or helpful in other conflicts. As Ilde has noted, some negotiations to
arrive at arrangements to limit wars are better conducted tacitly.195 Of course,
if this type of convention is exportable, then international decision-makers
should add it to their set of policy options when considering the best way to
control violent conflict.
More generally, while the April Agreement regulates the actions of
military forces in a hot conflict, scholars might benefit from more detailed
scrutiny of other examples of coordinated behavior in the context of war. The
case at hand suggests that observers might find states behaving according to
tacitly or explicitly bargained-upon patterns, even in situations in which one
might assume such coordination to be impossible due to the conditions of war.
While the April Agreement remains a unique example of an explicitly
negotiated written agreement with a special monitoring mechanism, it
suggests that other tacitly negotiated or unwritten arrangements may be
reached between warring parties. Indeed, the April Agreement demonstrates
that the vagaries of the international system may drive states to coordinate on
what might otherwise appear as bizarre arrangements, but which the legal
Moreover, even assuming that Israel and Syria would not have been able to reach this kind of
understanding without foreign intervention, it remains an open question whether the parties and the
civilians of the region would have been better served by a short-term unhindered war.
195. Dlde notes the Korean War as an example of a situation in which explicit bargaining could
have been damaging. He argues, "The mutually observed restrictions in the Korean War (for instance,
no attacks on the supply lines leading into North and South Korea) is an example of arrangements that
would not have been facilitated or might even have been upset by negotiation." FRED CHARLES IKLE,
How NATIONS NEGOTIATE 5 (1981).
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scholar can interpret as negotiated codes of behavior which, despite their costs
and their flaws, allow the states to meet mutual interests.
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APPENDIX I: JuLY 12, 1996 PROTOCOL ON THE WORKING RULE FOR THE
ISRAEL-LEBANON MONITORING GROUP
1. Overview of the Monitoring Group
A. The Monitoring Group (M.G.) established by the April 26, 1996
understanding consists of delegates headed by military representatives of the
five countries: the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. The
existence of the Monitoring Group will be temporary, until a peaceful solution
through negotiations is reached. The Monitoring Group will not be a part of
these negotiations.
B. The Monitoring Group will have a Chair and a Co-chair. These
responsibilities will be undertaken by the United States and France alternately.
The United States will appoint the first Chair. France will appoint the first Co-
chair. The first Chair will serve until December 1, and thereafter each Chair
will serve for five months. The Chair and the Co-chair will work together
closely in a spirit of full coordination and cooperation.
C. The Chair of the Monitoring Group will receive complaints from
Lebanon and Israel and will circulate them among the members of the group.
The Chair will also call for meetings and conduct such meetings.
D. The Chair will be available to receive complaints from Lebanon
and196 Israel at any time. The Chair will determine its address at an
appropriate diplomatic mission.
E. Complaints will be submitted in a written form to the Chair of the
group within twenty-four hours in the event of a claimed violation of the
understanding. The Chair will immediately notify the members by providing a
copy of the complaint and call a meeting in Naqura immediately.
2. The Functions of the Monitoring Group
A. The group, with all its members, will be in charge of monitoring
the application of provisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the understanding.
B. The group will deal with complaints and will address the
complaints submitted according to procedures described below.
3. The Mechanism
A. By invitation of the group Chair, or at the request of its
members, 197 the military representatives of 198 their delegations of the five
196. Giladi's version reads "or." Giladi, supra note 34, at 388.
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states will meet at Naqura in order to carry out their responsibilities under the
understanding of April 26, 1996.
It has been agreed that the military representatives who will lead their
countries' delegations will be at a senior rank. Meetings of the Monitoring
Group, with the participation limited to the five member states, will be held at
the UNIFJL headquarters at Naqura.
B. The members of the Monitoring Group will determine through
their discussions whether the matter requires verification.
C. Verification in Lebanon will be undertaken by representatives of
the United States, France, Lebanon, and Syria if Syria desires; in Israel,
verification will be undertaken by representatives of the United States, France,
and Israel. Furthermore, wherever in practice the work of the verification
mission requires, Lebanon and Israel will be asked to facilitate the movement
and safety and security of the verification mission to enable it to carry out its
task as it relates to the complaint.
D. On the basis of Israel's and Lebanon's commitment to the April
26, 1996 understanding, and without derogation from any of the terms: Israel
and Lebanon will take necessary measures to facilitate the work and ensure
the safety of the Group, and refrain from any actions and reactions which
could endanger the Group and 199 its work during the period of review of a
complaint. For the Monitoring Group to function effectively, Lebanon and
Israel will strive to create a stable and tranquil environment for it to carry out
its work.
E. The Monitoring Group will draw up its report about the complaint
within 72 hours after the submission of the complaint. If there is unanimity
among the members of the Monitoring Group, the report will identify the
party responsible for not complying with the understanding, will address and
deal with the situation and will contain recommendations for enhancing
compliance with the understanding. If there is no unanimity, the report will
contain a description of the Monitoring Group discussions of the complaint
and the results of the verification mission, and the matter will be referred to
the Foreign Ministers, taking into consideration that the Foreign Ministers of
197. Giladi's version reads, "or at the request of any one of its members." Id. In theory, this
difference in wording could result in a significantly different meaning. While the wording presented by
Beilin might imply that all of the member states aside from the Chair would have to jointly request a
meeting, the addition of the words "any one of' would make it clear that any single party to the group
could request a meeting. In practice, the Monitoring Group only met when there was an actual complaint
filed by Lebanon or Israel, not at the request of other group members.
198. Giladi's version uses "and" in place of "of." Id. In practice, both the military
representatives and the rest of the delegations of the five states participated in the meetings.
199. The version presented by Giladi reads "in its work." Id. at 389. The use of the word "and"
lends the provision broader application as it would require the states to refrain from endangering both
the group members and its work. Under either reading, though, the states are required "to strive" to
maintain stability and tranquility.
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the United States, Syria, and France will exert their efforts to help resolve the
problem in consultation with the Foreign Ministers of the parties involved.
F. Each state in the Monitoring Group will bear the expenses of its
representatives.
-July 12, 1996200
200. BEILIN, supra note 42, 123-25 (reproducing English text of the protocol establishing the
ILMG); see also discussion in supra note 42.
Clashing Behavior, Converging Interests
APPENDIX II: SAMPLE STATEMENT OF THE ISRAEL-LEBANON MONITORING
GROUP
Monday, May 10, 1999
United States Department of State:
Press statement on behalf of the Chair of the Lebanon-Israel Monitoring
Group
The Monitoring Group met on May 5-6, 1999, at the UNIFIL
Headquarters compound in Naqura, Lebanon to consider five complaints of
violation of the April 26, 1996 Understanding, three filed by Israel and six
filed by Lebanon.
With regard to the Israeli complaints concerning two attacks initiated by
a Lebanese armed group on April 24, 1999 in the area of Haddatha and el-
Mansouri/Majdal Zun, there was no agreement on whether the launching sites
were in a civilian populated area. The Monitoring Group stressed the
importance of ensuring that civilian lives and property are not put at risk in the
course of military operations and, to this end, urged those launching attacks to
err on the side of caution in selecting firing sites where there could be a risk of
civilian casualties and property damage as a result of counter-fire.
With regard to the Lebanese complaints concerning Khirbat Silm
Jarjouaa, and Jibal al-Butm, the Monitoring Group acknowledged that on
April 27, 1999, following an attack initiated by a Lebanese armed group
against a military target, one 155mm round fired by Israeli forces impacted
near an inhabited house in Khirbat Silm, damaging a walled house fence. The
Monitoring Group also acknowledged that on April 27, 1999, following an
attack initiated by a Lebanese armed group against a military target, eight
120mm rounds fired by Israel and those cooperating with it impacted in
Jarjouaa, injuring two civilians and damaging five houses and an electrical
net. With regard to Jibal al-Butm, the Monitoring Group acknowledged that
on April 28, 1999, one 160-mm round fired by Israel or those cooperating
with it impacted in the village, damaging a walled house fence. The
Monitoring Group concluded that these three incidents constituted violations
of the Understanding and called on Israel to take effective measures to ensure
that such incidents are not repeated.
With regard to the Lebanese complaint concerning Nabatieh el-
Fawka, the Lebanese delegate stated that on April 27, 1999, following an
attack initiated by a Lebanese armed group against a military target, three
81mm rounds impacted in the village, damaging a house. With regard to the
Israeli complaint concerning Maknouni, the Israeli delegate stated that on
April 27, 1999, during the course of an attack initiated by a Lebanese armed
group against a military target, a mortar shell impacted in the village,
damaging one house. In response to these violation complaints, the Israeli and
Lebanese delegates respectively stated that [sic] had no knowledge of any
firing at the times and places indicated by the other side. They added they
20021
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would further investigate the respective complaints and report back to the
Monitoring Group as appropriate.
With regard to the Lebanese complaint concerning Zibqin, the
Monitoring Group acknowledged that on May 4, 1999, three air-to-surface
missiles fired toward the village by Israeli Air Force helicopters destroyed one
house and damaged 18 others. With regard to the Lebanese complaint
concerning Baalbek, the Monitoring Group acknowledged that on the same
evening, two air-to-surface missiles fired toward the city by Israeli aircraft
injured five civilians, destroyed a public building, and damaged a mosque, a
cemetery, and the electricity network. In addition, several dozen houses
sustained broken glass and other minor damage.
The Monitoring Group expressed its strong disapproval of these
incidents, which constitute violations of the Understanding and which have
resulted in a grave situation with civilian casualties and extensive property
damage. The Monitoring Group also called on Israel to desist from a
repetition of such incidents in the future, which can contribute to a serious
increase in tensions and to a deterioration of the situation. It also called on
Israel to more effectively implement its commitment pursuant to the April
Understanding not to target civilians or their property in Lebanon.
The Monitoring Group expressed its great appreciation to UNIFIL for
201providing facilities and support for the meeting.
201. U.S. Department of State, Press Statement-on Behalf of the Chairman of the Israel-
Lebanon Monitoring Group, M2 PRESSWIRE, May 10, 1999, LEXIS, News Group File.
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